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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception 249 interpretation of "satisfaction", the satisfaction-relation that holds between the desire, resolve, will, intention, and craving, and the objects x, y, z, w and r respectively that are supposed to satisfy each intentional state as enumerated would be the same. But the satisfaction-relation is not exactly the same for each: y and w must be an action, whereas x and z need not be and r is highly unlikely to be. If the stipulated satisfaction-relation cannot distinguish between the requirements of a desire, a resolve, a will, an intention, and a craving, what good is it? 4. Malevolent Other-Directed Desires Like self-directed desires, other-directed desires can be selfish or selfindulgent without being ultimately self-directed. An other-directed desire is selfish if the agent accords more value to the gain its satisfaction brings him than to the gain its satisfaction brings to the others to whom it is directed. This is consistent with the object of the desire's being the other in question rather than the concomitant experience of satisfaction that outweighs it in value. Any malevolent or spiteful desire would serve as an example, since in these cases the value of the gain its satisfaction brings oneself is inversely proportional to the value of the gain its satisfaction brings to the other (and directly proportional to the value of the other's loss): If you want me to fail in my ambitions, then the less satisfaction I obtain from my strivings, the more you obtain by thwarting them, and the more I fail, the better you like it.7 But benevolent other-directed desires can be selfish, too, if the agent accords higher value to the gain its satisfaction brings her than to the gain its satisfaction brings the other to whom it is directed. Someone who takes great satisfaction in charitable fundraising but is comparatively indifferent to the gains this activity will entail for its recipients would be an example. Here selfishness might manifest itself as deep-seated frustration or resistance to the discovery that its recipients are harmed rather than helped by it. An other-directed desire is self-indulgent if its satisfaction is impulsive and self-destructive to the agent, even if it is beneficial to the other at whom it is directed. For example, someone who satisfies five times a day his impulsive desire to call his partner at work may be indulging a caring impulse that may gradually undermine his autonomy, even if it is directed at making his partner feel loved and succeeds at doing so. 4.1. Brutalization Like benevolent desires, malevolent other-directed desires can be selfindulgent if their satisfaction is not only self-destructive but also impulsive. I shall refer to malevolent other-directed desires, i.e. desires to deliberately On the existence of bona fide malevolent desires, see Michael Stocker, "Desiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology," The Journal of Philosophy LXXVI, 12 (December 1979), 738-753. 7 © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
