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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conception 451 constituent of a Humean self. The oversensitivity to being slighted that Dent describes is a natural concomitant. Dent argues that this oversensitivity in turn provokes in one the desire to rectify one's situation through retaliation, by lashing out at the offender. Dent's analysis by itself does not, I think, cover all cases of anger; nor does it explain the origins of simple first-order political discrimination. But it does provide insight into why higher-order political discriminators, like simple first-order political discriminators, are apt to become so angry, so often, at imagined slights from seemingly arrogant disvaluees. The more inferior one feels, the more expressions of esteem one requires. And the more inferior one perceives a disvaluee to be, the more elaborate the disvaluee's expression of esteem of one is required to be. Whereas a friendly nod from a perceived superior is sufficient to transport one to a state of grace, anything less than a full-length obeisance from a perceived inferior appears to be an insult. In the American Deep South up to the mid-1960s, for example, for an African American to meet the gaze of a European American was perceived as an offense; and for an African American man even to look at a European American woman was to invite lynching. Even now, African Americans are still expected to do rather too much grinning and shuffling compared to their European American counterparts, although the retaliatory sanctions for disobedience are now a bit more oblique. In all such cases, irascibility regularly directed at particular members of disvalued groups should not be dismissed as simply an idiosyncrasy of character, even if it is not intentionally directed at members of disvalued groups as such. It is, nevertheless, an overt expression of higherorder political discrimination. A second, related example of behavior and judgments distorted by higher-order political discrimination is the treatment of disvaluees in a way that would constitute a clear insult or faux pas, if the person so treated were one of one's recognized peers. For example, a European American Gentile may privately make an anti-Semitic remark to an African American colleague, in a misguided effort to establish rapport, when such a remark would be seen as a serious social lapse even among other European American Gentiles. Or a heterosexual may make gratuitous disparaging remarks to a gay colleague about her work or job performance, of a sort designed to "cut her down to size" rather than provide constructive criticism. Or a man may make offensively personal remarks to a woman colleague about her physical appearance, personal life, or manner of dress, of a sort that would be highly inappropriate if they were made to another man. Or he might expect from a woman colleague extra forbearance for fits of temper, irresponsible conduct, or extraordinary professional demands that he would not from a man. The higher-order political discriminator, in other social contexts, may be acclaimed quite rightly as a "prince among men"; to disvaluees, however, he reveals himself as Mr. Hyde. © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
