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Show Chapter X. The Criterion of Inclusiveness 390 morally significant behavior. Typically, one interpretation of the act identifies it as a moral dereliction - and therefore subject to moral control, whereas the other identifies it as irrelevant to or outside the scope of moral discussion. The former interpretation presupposes a moral theory that includes this type of act within its scope, whereas the latter interpretation presupposes one that excludes it - and thus transforms into a theoretical anomaly what ought to be well within its range. Thus the dilemma is not generated by an inconsistency in the moral theory we accept, but rather is a dilemma about which moral theory to accept, in order to understand the act in question and the data of moral experience more generally. This is the issue under discussion in this chapter. By examining some of the issues involved in granting or withholding moral significance in interpreting a particular act, I try to suggest in somewhat more detailed terms what the criterion of inclusiveness comes to in the case of moral theory. 3. Moral Interpretation and Vertical Consistency The goal of understanding the data of moral experience by subsuming it under the terms and concepts of a moral theory is distinct from that of explaining the data of moral experience. The question is not the relatively higher-level one of which hypothesis about ideally moral agent character will correctly predict the act in question as an outcome. That question can be raised only following an answer to the more basic and essential questions as to whether the act is morally significant at all; and if so, under what moral rubric it should be subsumed. Thus a resolution of the dilemma will yield us the correct, theory-laden observational term to apply to the act in question: Is it an abuse of power? A betrayal of trust? Or, alternately, is it an act of conviction? Or an affirmation of loyalty? Or is it more appropriately treated as an innocuous act, unremarkable in its moral neutrality and so inherently proscriptive of moral commentary? That these questions are raised at all probably rules out the lastmentioned alternative. A genuinely innocuous act does not proscribe moral commentary; it renders it superfluous. The proscription of moral commentary is, more usually, a conspiratorial proscription of boat-rocking - a sure sign that moral commentary is urgently needed in order to prevent the boat from sinking and the rats from jumping ship. In order to arrive at an answer to these questions, characterizing the sequence of behaviors in morally neutral terms alone is insufficient unless there is prior intersubjective agreement on its moral significance or lack thereof - in which case the search for moral terms in which to describe it is unnecessary. But prior intersubjective agreement does not always exist. Some people need to have explained to them what is questionable about using federal funds earmarked for low-income housing to build a luxury high-rise for personal profit. Others understand what there is to question, but conclude, in accordance with the dictates of their moral theory, that the questions can be © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
