| OCR Text |
Show Chapter X. The Criterion of Inclusiveness 392 apply the relevant moral sanctions to an act we initially interpreted as morally blameworthy. In this case we can either revise our moral interpretation of the act within the theory, or jettison that type of act from the domain of the theory altogether. Suppose the former alternative ramifies throughout the rest of the theory in such a way as to generate vertical inconsistencies. Suppose, for instance, that after discovering our unwillingness to prosecute date rape, we revise our interpretation of the act so as to excuse date rape while continuing to condemn physical assault more generally (perhaps on the grounds that the concept of a date implies a mutual presumption of intimacy). We are then confronted with a prima facie vertical inconsistency, between proscribing physical assault in general and permitting what would seem to be a particular instance of it, that damages the viability of the theory. In order to repair it, the dilemma of moral interpretation may be raised again: Is so-called date rape really an instance of physical assault - thus subject to moral sanction? Or is it just particularly energetic sex between consenting adults - thus (at least on some accounts) morally unremarkable? The dilemma of moral interpretation may be reiterated at increasingly higher-level laws of the theory. Thus one may also call into question whether kissing someone could ever constitute physical assault; whether physical assault itself is always a bad thing; whether bad things may not be more accurately identified as good if their consequences are; and so forth. Alternatively, we may solve the dilemma of moral interpretation by circumscribing the scope of the theory more narrowly. For example, we may deny that date rape ever in fact occurs (perhaps on the grounds that the recipient indicates his or her desire for sex by going on the date in the first place). Or we can circumscribe the theory even more radically, by jettisoning physical assault in general as a type of act warranting moral condemnation. Thus we may fiddle endlessly and pseudorationally with the interpretative terms of the theory so as to avoid the consequence of having to prosecute date rape, finally transforming a vague but unexceptionable moral theory into a bizarre pseudorational parody of moral reasoning. In order to avoid getting stuck with a moral theory vitiated by vertical inconsistency, moral blinders, and bad conscience, we must either fashion a different theory that avoids these evils, or else rethink our unwillingness to act on our original condemnation of date rape. Only after we have solved the dilemma of moral interpretation of the particular act in some such manner does the type of moral dilemma concerned with conflicts between obligations arise. Thus the target of scrutiny under discussion in this chapter is the moral theories we hold in reality, as revealed in our social behavior - not the abstract and idealized theories we may profess and defend in discussion. These latter theories are inherently inadequate to the moral data because their principles qua principles cannot fully reflect the complexity of our actual moral practices. By focusing on the question of how to apply the criterion of © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
