| OCR Text |
Show Chapter IX. "Ought" In Chapter VIII I offered a general description of how pseudorationality might function to square our morally derelict behavior with the constraints and demands of our favored moral theories, so as to eradicate any horizontal or vertical inconsistencies between them. In this chapter I sharpen that description with an analysis of the linguistic relation between that behavior and normative moral theory itself - more specifically, between that behavior and the requirements of conduct exacted by the ideal descriptive moral theory K described in Chapter V.5.2. There I was concerned to sketch the Hempelian structure and descriptive status of K. I argued that normative moral theory in general and Kant's moral theory in particular was descriptive of ideal rationality and so contained no "ought." This argument made it easy to see how normative moral theory might be continuous with explanatory theories in the social and physical sciences; and more importantly might be integrated into our informal theorizing about the world and ourselves in general. In the first Critique's Resolution of the Third Antinomy, Kant also observes, however, that no "oughts" are to be found in the sensible world of nature either (1C, A 547/B 575). By arguing in Chapter VIII that in the non-ideal case, we usually act as we please, often in violation of such a theory and so in violation of our honorific self-conceptions, then pseudorationalize our moral derelictions so as to ensure the illusion of conformity to this descriptive ideal, I seconded Kant's observation in this instance as well. If the "ought" is to be found neither in ideal descriptive moral theory nor in non-ideal descriptive reality, it would seem that moral prescriptions, commands or imperatives find application neither in the ideal nor in the nonideal case. However, this conclusion would be premature. In this chapter I invoke the pseudorational functions described in Chapters VII and VIII to ground a linguistic analysis of "ought" as a functional intermediary between the ideal morality of Theory K and the reality of our imperfect attempts to conform to it. One implication of this view is that there is no distinctively normative realm, either conceptually or metaphysically. Norms can be decomposed into descriptive principles and the non-ideal, actual behavior they guide. Our magnanimous moral ideals and parsimonious moral behavior are all we have to work with. Section 1 introduces the first of three causal factors that inculcate a personal investment in an ideal descriptive moral theory such as K in the process of socialization. Section 2 invokes this factor - the authority of fact - in order to explain the particular conative force and linguistic peculiarity of commands. Section 3 introduces the second two causal factors - the authority of consensus and of reward - that reinforce this personal investment, and so the potency of K as a lens through which we perceive ourselves and our |
