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Show Chapter IX. "Ought" 380 If, on the other hand, K is violated less severely, and later in life, then our personal investment in it will be stronger, and our allegiance to it in the face of disconfirming evidence more secure. In this case, the explanatory adequacy of K will remain an open question, in spite of evidence that disconfirms it. Its laws will have the status of hypotheses, and we will simply evaluate the evidence for and against it as it comes, both from our own behavior and from others'. We will often raise questions about another's trustworthiness or benevolence toward us, and be uncertain as to the veracity of our moral judgments about her. We will sometimes deplore those impulsive - because deeply instilled - dispositions to confide in those who prove themselves untrustworthy, and feel ashamed of our suspicions and defensiveness before those who prove themselves to be friends. We will often revise our judgments about another's moral guilt, in light of increasing evidence of her moral capacity or lack thereof, and strive to understand another's motives in a way that nullifies the appropriateness of moral blame. We will strive to cope with moral temptation, and we will often be uncertain as to the outcome of our efforts. Each of these epistemic adjustments is part of the process by which we ascertain whether, or how, or to what uncertain extent our ideal descriptive moral theory applies at all. These are the conditions under which use of the moral "ought", the "should" of tentative expectation, is appropriate. But to suggest, as some philosophers have, that we might do better without our moral theory altogether, is to fail to recognize the real alternative to it - that bleak and ugly landscape of pervasive moral corruption - that already stands much too close at hand. © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
