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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conception 413 Earlier it was suggested that there do exist moral considerations that might reasonably outweigh the prima facie duty to relieve an innocent agent's suffering; but preserving a bully system's equilibrium by permitting its members to inflict such suffering is not one of them. By constraining the application of moral principles of aid or restitution only to members of the group or network, or perverting their application so as to relieve moral transgressors of accountability, a bully system both narrows the scope of application of the theory and manipulates the formulation of its principles so as to exclude outsiders from its full protection. (4) redresses that exclusion, by withholding moral recognition from such a system; and, in particular, by withholding verbal acknowledgment, and elaboration and facilitation of such verbal acknowledgment, that might call up emotions of respect and acceptance of it in the speakers, and motivate behavior expressive of these emotions (Section 5.1, (1.a) - (1.d), above). Regardless of the advantages or attractions a bully system may offer, it deserves neither our respect nor our acceptance but rather our condemnation. 7. "Seeing Things" (1)-(4) obviously have many other applications beyond those examined in the hypothetical case I have invoked to derive them. And it is unlikely that (1)-(4) constitute the only criteria of inclusiveness a practically adequate moral theory must satisfy. But I would maintain that they at least constitute a significant subclass of them, because each responds to a familiar, pseudorational strategy by which relevant moral data are typically excluded from moral consideration. Among the main contenders for practical adequacy I have examined, a Kantian-type moral theory appears to be the only one capable of satisfying each of (1)-(4).15 To review the arguments of this chapter: Classical Utilitarianism licenses less than full acknowledgment of a person's rational agency when this promotes general welfare, thus violating (1). AntiRationalism does the same when the agent in question is not personally attached to the right social network. Classical Utilitarianism, Intuitionism, and certain varieties of Marxism devalue a victim's moral knowledge relative to that of any arbitrarily selected cognoscenta, thus violating (3). And both Anti15 I have not examined so-called "virtue theories" that purport to be based in Aristotle's ethics because I do not think this particular appeal to authority is well-grounded. As we know, Kant also has a virtue theory that he develops in MM Part II; and Aristotle arguably gives the same pride of place to reason and rational deliberation as does Kant. No viable "virtue theory" can be coherently articulated without reference to guiding rationality principles of the sort that both Kant's and Aristotle's normative moral theories contain, and that provide the central focus of attention in this discussion. For further discussion of Aristotle's own moral theory, see Volume I, Chapter V.1.4. This original in any case falls short of satisfying (1) - (4), because it straightforwardly fails the general criterion of inclusiveness in the ways indicated in Section 2.3 and 2.5 above. © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
