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Show Chapter X. The Criterion of Inclusiveness 396 revealed to be incapacitated from passing reliable judgment on a whole host of moral issues. Similarly, Smith's suggestion that Washington is lacking in reflective balance, or evaluates Vogeler's behavior too negatively implies that those rational processes themselves have been subverted by Washington's psychological or emotional makeup, and hence that her substantive moral theory itself is deficient. Smith also implies his own authority and competence to make such a judgment, based on his superior knowledge of Vogeler and of the tenure process, and on his greater distance from the conflict in question. Smith's response to Washington thereby raises essentially the same dilemma, about how to choose between moral theories; at the meta-level of how to choose between choosers of moral theories: Is Washington's identification of Vogeler's behavior as harassment itself evidence that she is defective as a moral judge? Is Smith's identification of Washington as defective in moral judgment itself a testimonial to his own moral acuity? Who is to decide between Smith and Washington as to who is the more reliable moral evaluator? This hypothetical example demonstrates that the object-level dilemma, of how to choose between competing moral theories, is not conceptually dependent on the meta-level dilemma, of how to choose between competing choosers of moral theories. In theory it is possible that, rather than attack Washington's credibility as a moral judge, Smith might have politely begged to differ with her interpretation and retreated from the field, thus shirking his own responsibility as moral mediator. This would have left intact the presumption of Washington's equal status as a competent player in the game of moral evaluation. But it also would have left unresolved the impasse between Smith and Washington, as to whether Vogeler's behavior was morally blameworthy or not. This impasse must be resolved, if Vogeler's behavior is to be situated within the system of practical moral controls that govern the community of moral agents of which Vogeler, Smith, and Washington are all presumptive members. Otherwise the efficacy of that system itself will begin to deteriorate, to no one's ultimate advantage. So it is not a trivial matter which interpretation of Vogeler's behavior finally prevails. Nor is it merely a matter of intellectual disagreement that Smith and Washington have different moral views of this. Their respective moral theories concur to the extent of agreeing that if Vogeler's behavior toward Washington constitutes harassment, Vogeler is morally blameworthy and Washington deserves vindication. Where they differ is at the crucial point of determining what overt physical behavior constitutes harassment and what does not. For example, it may turn out that Smith's moral theory groups under the rubric of "harassment" only physical abuse - pinching, hitting, rape, etc., whereas Washington's theory groups under that heading any hostile behavior that causes her intense mental distress, i.e. emotional and verbal as well as physical abuse. To determine which of these theories is to prevail is © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
