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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conception 397 also to determine which of these theories is more adequate to the data of moral experience - i.e. which most perceptively and inclusively identifies behavior to which a condemnatory or condoning moral response is appropriate. This is important because that theory, in turn, will determine when and where to apply the practical moral controls that return the community to equilibrium; and who has a say in deciding in what community equilibrium consists. In this enterprise there can be only one winner, and polite talk of the subjective incompatibility of different worldviews is beside the point. If Washington is right, Smith and Vogeler are morally culpable and she is not; whereas if she is wrong, she is morally culpable and they are not. Washington's and Smith's moral theories are not just different; they are competing, and serious personal and professional consequences follow for everyone, depending on whose moral theory prevails. To fight this "war of words" is thereby to fight the Great War for Control of Reality, in which no prisoners are taken. Hence from the no-holds-barred perspective, it is perhaps not surprising that Smith attempts to undermine Washington's evaluative authority and credibility at the same time that he rejects her moral judgment. The object-level dilemma is practically dependent on the meta-level dilemma, because the authority and credibility of one's favored moral theory presupposes the authority and credibility of oneself as moral judge. 5. Implications of Inclusiveness 5.1. Recognition of Rationality The practical dependence of the object-level dilemma on the meta-level dilemma itself provides a starting point for deliberation about the relative merits of Washington's and Smith's favored moral theories respectively. Although there can be only one winner of the competition among moral theories as candidates for the actual system to which the community of moral agents consistently adheres on a particular occasion, a moral theory that prevails because its proponents have obliterated, ignored, or sabotaged the credibility and authority of their rivals is no real winner at all; for it cannot command the rational assent of those rivals who continue to maintain different theoretical allegiances. In reality, Smith's attempt to devalue Washington as a competent moral judge to her face is a pseudorational attempt to simultaneously deny her authoritative status as a moral agent and gain her theoretical allegiance, without examining rationally the case to be made on her behalf. If he can convince Washington that her mental distress is excessive relative to the event that purportedly caused it; that that event did not in fact cause it because Washington saw offense in inoffensive behavior; and that in any case Washington's reaction is unimportant relative to preserving the collegial status quo, he will have convinced Washington, effectively, that she really was just "seeing things," and so that there is no moral case to be made © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
