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Show Chapter II. Reason in the Structure of the Self 62 expect to find necessity in the rule that predicates fiscal transparency of corporate accounting offices. Presumably only certain kinds of conceptual specifications of how certain kinds of things ought to be done have necessity in this sense. But if necessity just is conformity to a rule, as Brandom's Kant claims, then the necessity that distinguishes these particular conceptual specifications consists, presumably, in according with some further rule that conceptually specifies how these particular conceptual specifications ought to function; and the necessity of this rule, in turn, in according with yet a further one that conceptually specifies its functioning. Hence either the sense in which any particular conceptual specification is necessary is always at one remove from the conceptual specification itself; or else Brandom's Kant cannot mean to identify necessity with conforming to a rule simpliciter. There has to be more to necessity than this. Brandom further characterizes Kant's faculty of understanding as the "active, cognitive faculty" that "synthesize[s], bring[s] things into a unity - that is, subject[s] them to rules or concepts" (MIE 80). That synthesizing activity, he asserts, "is an aspect of judging." In support of this assertion he quotes Kant's own claim at 1C, A 79/B 104 - 105: (C) (1) The same function which imparts unity to various representations in one judgment (2) imparts unity likewise to the mere synthesis of various representations in one intuition, (3) which in a general way may be called the pure concept of the understanding. (4) The same understanding, and by the same operations by which in concepts it achieves through analytical unity the logical form of a judgment, (5) introduces also, through the synthetical unity of the manifold in intuition, a transcendental element into its representations. In his footnote to this citation, Brandom adds that "the ‘transcendental element' introduced in this way is just reference to objects" (MIE 80 fn. 18). I discuss this passage below. 1.3. My Kant I do not agree with Brandom that Kant rejects the "pre-Kantian tradition" described in passage (A) above. However, I also do not think that Kant accepts it - at least not in this form. Nor do I agree that 1C, A 69/B 94 shows that Kant believed the judgment to be "the fundamental unit of awareness or cognition, the minimum graspable" (MIE 79). Above I offered some evidence that Brandom does not entirely believe this, either. Finally, I do not think Brandom is justified in appealing to Kant's authority in support of his inferentialist program. However, I also do not think this makes Kant a representationalist. Kant's view is a more complex one that incorporates signature elements of both views. A full defense of these opinions is unnecessary for purposes of this discussion. I undertake only as much of one © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
