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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conception 291 for distinguishing rational from pseudorational denial. I focus henceforth on the character of the dogmatist for its probable relevance to all or most of those potential readers of this volume, including me. Section 6 is devoted to discussion of the pseudorational mechanism of dissociation in response to theoretical anomaly, with application to several examples, including that of art-critical responses to contemporary art; and compares my account with Philip Bromberg's. Section 7 addresses the pseudorational mechanism of rationalization, and applies it to the anachronistic racist theories of Jensen and Murray. Section 8 invokes all three mechanisms in the analysis of a real-life historical example. I argue that in the case of first-person theoretical anomaly, they function in tandem as a form of self-deception. In subsequent chapters I explore the implications of this form of self-deception for the possibility of moral integrity. 1. Three Pseudorational Mechanisms First, a general sketch with details to come later. We saw in Chapter II that vertical consistency requires that the various components of our experience be integrated and unified under the rubric of more general, comprehensive, and motivationally effective concepts and principles; and that all of these also satisfy the requirement of horizontal consistency relative to one another. For example, take the relatively general and motivationally effective cognitive principle that we are to understand an external event in the world by seeking out its causal relations. This principle is horizontally consistent with that of understanding internal mental events, such as beliefs and feelings, by seeking out their causal origins in our upbringing, social environment, and previous experiences. But it is also similar in its reliance on causal explanation. The more general principle with which both are vertically consistent is that we understand all the phenomena of experience by seeking out their causal connections. However, there are anomalies to which this more general principle seems not to apply. Then we resort to pseudorational mechanisms in order to explain them. A familiar example is the micro-phenomena studied by quantum physics, which seem peculiarly resistant to causal explanation. Our instinctive response is to begin by denying the phenomenon, and to cast about for flaws in the experimental design or apparatus to account for the apparent illusion. The intractability of the phenomenon to our attempts to wish it away are then met by rationalization: We argue that there must be a causal explanation of this phenomenon, but that we are insufficiently equipped to discover its causes. When the evidence indicates the untenability of this position, we shrug our shoulders and proceed to dissociate the phenomena of quantum physics from the comprehensible world of causal relations we aspire to grasp. We then suffer the perplexity of trying, and failing to see how the © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
