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Show Chapter VII. Pseudorationality 296 As indicated above, both conceptual and theoretical anomalies can be of two kinds. Third-person conceptual anomalies are events, objects or states of affairs in the external environment that violate the horizontal and vertical consistency over time of the concepts constitutive of our perspective, and so the conceptual presuppositions by which we make that environment rationally intelligible. Third-person theoretical anomalies are events, objects or states of affairs that violate the horizontal and vertical consistency over time of our theories about the world or external environment. First-person conceptual anomalies are those events, objects or states of affairs in the interior environment - our own behavior or emotional reactions, or thoughts or psychological attitudes or states of mind - that similarly violate the horizontal and vertical consistency over time of the concepts constitutive of our perspectives on ourselves as interiorized agents, and so the conceptual presuppositions by which we make ourselves rationally intelligible to ourselves. First-person theoretical anomalies are those events, objects or states of affairs that violate our theories of ourselves. Since I ultimately wish to address issues pertaining to normative moral theory, the following discussion will be concerned primarily with the type of pseudorationality called forth by firstpersonal theoretical anomaly; I embark on this exploration in Chapter VIII. But it will be convenient to dissect the operations of pseudorationality by beginning with third-person conceptual anomaly, because it is usually easier to see things at a distance from oneself, and sometimes easier to see them than to theorize about them. 3. Test Case #1: Encounter on West Broadway Suppose, then, that you are in New York, making your way down West Broadway, where anything may happen, and you suddenly encounter - what? It is large, mottled gray, prickly, shapeless, undulating, and it moos at you. You have at the disposal of your current perspective certain concepts of higher-order properties that might enable you to recognize this entity - street sculpture, advertising gimmick, genetic mutation, three-martini lunch hallucination, tropical plant, etc.; but it is not immediately evident which one would suffice in these circumstances, or whether any of them would. It is tempting to think that this is just the sort of case that belies the necessity of the requirement of vertical consistency to rational intelligibility. For in this case, it may seem, you must know at least that you have encountered a gray blob, even though you don't know what higher-order kind of gray blob it is. But reconsider. If it is unclear which of those higher-order properties now at your disposal would enable you to recognize this entity, any of them might. If it is unclear whether any of them would, none of them might. If none of them did, concepts that would enable you to recognize this entity would not form part of your current perspective. I am using the term "recognition" here in the technical Kantian sense, spelled out in Chapter II.3, of recognition in a © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
