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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conception 369 whose behavior is in question, "should" functions as a reminder of what those expectations are. I shall refer to this "should" as the "should" of tentative expectation. My thesis is that when used categorically, commands express predictions whereas imperatives express tentative expectations. Commands appropriate the force of factual reality because they reproduce or condense the grammar of categorical and assertoric propositions, whereas imperatives disown some of that force by modally inflecting them with "ought." Sollen - the "should" of tentative expectation - connects an idealized, comprehensive explanatory theory of reality, structured by the requirements of horizontal and vertical consistency over time that in turn structures our conceptions of ourselves, other people, and the world, to the empirical reality of human experience. It does this by registering the slippage between the idealized theory we suppose to be valid, and the anomalous empirical data that regularly undermine it. It is because of our personal investment in this favored comprehensive theory that the categorical sollen expresses our suppositions or expectations about what is or will be the case; and it is because that theory, as solid and well grounded as it seems to be, is regularly assaulted by disconfirming or deviant data that those expectations are expressed tentatively. This proposal is perfectly general in nature, and applies to the categorical sollen in nonmoral as well as moral, and nonhuman as well as human contexts. But when applied specifically to human moral contexts, the categorical sollen, the "should" of tentative expectation, exhausts the meaning of the word "ought" as it is used in those moral contexts. It expresses an irresolvable tension between the rationally intelligible realm of moral ideals to which we feel committed - the moral ideals expressed in principles (A.1) through (D.2) discussed in Chapter V.5.2 - and the empirical reality of moral disillusionment with which we are regularly confronted. To the extent that these principles describe our idealized self-conception as rational beings, we identify with the actions the theory articulates, accept Theory K as true, and experience the commands and imperatives derivable from them as carrying the authority and force of fact. But since this self-conception is idealized, our identification with them cannot be complete. We are not unconditionally moved in every instance to perform the actions the theory articulates, nor suppose without reservation the theory to be true - nor, therefore, experience its commands and imperatives as statements purely of fact. Thus on this analysis, when we say of someone that he should or ought to keep his promise, we mean, first, that, he is supposed to keep his promise. Just as a postal carrier is supposed to deliver the snail mail, according to our ideal conception of the postal service, similarly a rational being is supposed to keep his promises, according to our ideal descriptive theory of moral behavior. Here we should not be misled by any apparent difference in "emotive flavor" between © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
