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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conception 197 objects that denote a certain metaphysical and structural condition of the agent whose experience and behavior satisfy them. As such, they furnish no sufficient psychological content - i.e. no intentional objects, no purposes, goals or ends an agent might adopt or by which an agent might be inspired to act. By themselves alone, they furnish structured place-holders for internally consistent experiential content. They are not the kind of entities that might motivate anyone to do any one thing in particular. But my consistency requirements of literal self-preservation are unlike Baron's conception of duty as a secondary motive, in that these requirements must first be met in order for an agent to adopt any such purposes, goals or ends as genuine preferences. By contrast, on Baron's conception, duty as a secondary motive is not a necessary condition of coherent experience or action in general. An agent can act coherently in the absence of this limiting condition, i.e. can violate the constraints of duty without violating the constraints of rational intelligibility. Whereas rational intelligibility is a necessary condition, duty as a secondary motive is a contingent condition of unified agency. I think Baron's conception of duty departs significantly from Kant's in this respect, but I defer discussion of that point to another occasion. A second characteristic of duty as a secondary motive is that it involves making a conscious and deliberate commitment to regulating the agent's conduct in accordance with what is right (113, 129, 140 fn. 22). This does not mean that he ignores or devalues the inclinational motives that prompt him to act (131), nor that he never fails to act according to the requirements of duty: [A] "perfect record" in doing one's duty is not only not sufficient to acting from duty but also not necessary. … one can correctly be said to act from duty even if one occasionally fails to do what one sees one should do. But the commitment will have other manifestations besides conformity to one's sense of duty, most notably, reflection on how one ought to live, readiness to revise one's moral beliefs and one's plans and aims in light of one's reflections, and willingness to entertain evidence that tells against one's moral beliefs. … The sense in which one acts from this commitment, even in instances in which [he] gives no thought to the ethical nature of [his] conduct before proceeding with the intended action, is roughly as follows: a very rich explanation of any nontrivial choice or action, e.g. the sort of explanation that a novelist might give, would make reference to some of the manifestations listed above (140 fn. 22). Thus a commitment to acting from duty as a secondary motive involves selfevaluation, introspection, reflection, and receptivity to rethinking one's beliefs and priorities in light of evidence and experience. It is a conscious choice about how to fashion one's life over the long term, including one's affective motives and sentiments, even if one fails to meet this standard in one's behavior on a particular occasion. © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
