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Show Chapter X. The Criterion of Inclusiveness In this chapter I give substance to my claim in Chapters I and Chapter V.5.2 above, that even though it is not possible to derive one particular substantive moral theory from value-neutral criteria of theoretical rationality - as both Kant and the Humeans discussed in Volume I have tried to do, only Kantian-type moral theories satisfy those criteria. I proposed such criteria in Chapters II, III and V, above. And in Chapter V.5.2, I extended Rawls's analogy with science by arguing that Kant's moral theory satisfies several of them - i.e. satisfies certain basic criteria for being a genuine theory: It includes testable hypotheses, nomological higher- and lower-level laws, theoretical constructs, internal principles, and bridge principles,1 all of which satisfy the criteria of horizontal and vertical consistency over time. I argued there that Kant's moral theory is an ideal, descriptive nomological-deductive theory that explains the behavior of a fully rational being. In Chapter IX above I argued, further, that Theory K generates testable hypotheses about the moral behavior of actual agents whom we initially assume to conform to its theoretical constructs; that the moral "ought" is best understood as the "ought" of tentative expectation expressed in the range of uses of the German sollen; and that the degree to which such a theory is well-confirmed is a function of the degree to which we judge actual, individual human agents, on a case-by-case basis, to be motivated by rationality, stupidity, or moral corruption in their actions. However, so far I have not contended that Theory K is the only normative moral theory, or an exemplar of the only type of normative moral theory, that meets these desiderata. On the contrary, I claimed that this analysis of "ought" could be made to hold for other major contenders, such as Utilitarianism or Aristotle's moral theory, as well. So there still remains unanswered the question of which of these theories is the best among the available alternatives. To answer this question, further criteria of selection that properly apply the theory to the non-ideal reality must be invoked. These criteria cull that theory or type of theory which passes this series of reality tests from those which do not. This will complete my solution to the problem of moral justification. The solution proposes that a moral theory is justified if it meets not only the idealized criteria of rationality I have offered in Part I; but also the further, practically adequate criteria I offer in this chapter that are in fact implicit in them. Familiar theoretical criteria I have not discussed include structural elegance and explanatory simplicity; but even these do not In the discussion of moral theory that follows, I reserve use of the term "laws" to refer to the components of ideal descriptive, explanatory moral theories, and "principles" to refer to their prescriptive practical applications for imperfect human beings. 1 |
