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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conception 279 thought and action not for him/herself, but rather as a source of pleasure.14 William's and Stocker's criticisms both assume that the moral principles that guide and motivate my action must be in the forefront of my mind as I respond to and interact with others, prompting me to assess and seek out persons and situations that instantiate them. That is, both criticisms assume that to be guided and motivated by moral principle is thereby to treat others merely as means to obeying it. These criticisms, so Kantian in spirit but which assume so unquestioningly the Humean models of motivation and rationality, are false. To be sure, if I am in fact a moral person, then moral principles apply to my personal relations, and my behavior toward others either exemplifies or violates these principles, regardless of any changes in my attitude toward either: All is fair neither in love nor in war. If, further, I identify myself as a moral person, then the principles derived from my moral theory not only apply to my personal relations, but also guide them. But that moral principles apply to and guide my personal relations cannot imply that my personal relations presuppose moral relations. For if we could have no personal relations without presupposing moral relations, there would be no examples for the principles that define moral relations to apply to. If I had not already befriended Ellsworth and recognized his peril, I could not obey the moral imperative to aid imperiled friends first, other things equal, in our situation. And if I bore no such personal relation to anyone, obviously this imperative could have no application at all. Hence my respect for this imperative need not blind me to Ellsworth's uniqueness, nor pre-empt my friendship for him, any more than my impartial belief that smoking is unhealthy blinds me to the temptation of the cigarette before me, or pre-empts the craving to which I am in danger of succumbing. It is an interesting view of moral obligations that regards them as stifling or distorting our personal relationships; as though the obligation to treat a friend with special care somehow took all the fun out of it. Moreover, it is precisely my respect for this moral imperative that obviates any doubt or ambivalence that might otherwise cause me to hesitate in deciding whom to rescue first. If I did not respect my special moral obligation, other things equal, to friends, my disposition to rescue Ellsworth first might be overriding, but it would not be unqualified by ambivalence about where my moral obligation lay. Without my recognition of Ellsworth as a friend, my disposition to rescue him first might not be qualified by qualms about my moral duty, but it might not be overriding either. Being motivated to rescue Ellsworth first by this moral principle, then, as much presupposes an Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories," The Journal of Philosophy LXXIII, 14 (August 12, 1976), 458. 14 © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
