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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception 39 7.2.3. Hume Himself Attempts are often made to counter the above objections to the Humean conception of the self by appeal to Hume's own authority. In particular, it is sometimes suggested that, despite superficial textual appearances to the contrary, Hume's model of rationality does not imply that rational action consists simply in satisfying one's desires as efficiently as possible, whatever they may be; and hence that the Humean model does not have the further counterintuitive consequence of identifying as rational actions that show a clear degree of irresponsibility or psychological instability. Rather, it is maintained that Hume did supply an account of rational final ends in his discussion of the calm passions and "steady and general view" that corrects the biases and contingencies of an individual's desires and perceptions; and that contemporary Humeans often implicitly presuppose this account. If true, this would mean that it was consistent with the Humean conception to impose special motivational restrictions on rational choosers in order to justify a moral theory, so long as these were compatible with such a steady and general view; hence that the above objections to the motivational and structural models of the Humean conception were directed against a straw man. Volume I therefore concludes with an examination of the original source of the Humean conception, and considers whether close attention to Hume's own writings - whether by his most able proponent or by me - deflects the above criticisms. Chapter XIII examines Annette Baier's thoroughgoing defense and exegetical revision of Hume. I show that, just as Kant incorporated Hume's insights into a yet broader and more subtle conception of the self, Baier's own defense of Hume similarly presupposes the very Kantian conception of the self she purports to reject. Chapter XIV then argues that a direct and detailed reconstruction of Hume's own views on these matters that considers all the relevant passages does not support the claim that he supplied an account of rational final ends. Instead, they undermine it. Hence the counterintuitive implications of Hume's own metaethics remain, as do the above objections to its use in justifying a normative moral theory. Finally Chapter XV summarizes and tracks the interconnections among the many Humean dogmas that have shaped the landscape of late twentieth century Anglo-American analytic philosophy, and thereby sets the stage for their refutation in Volume II. 7.3. Volume II: A Kantian Conception Volume II contends that after having devoted two and a half centuries of attention to the Humean conception, it is now time to move on to a sustained consideration of the historically more recent, philosophically more sophisticated conception of the self that Kant proposed in response to these problems (which he, unlike we, saw right away). This conception offers a solution to the above three problems that incorporates the prevailing © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
