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Show Chapter II. Reason in the Structure of the Self 72 and so on. Like the intentional object of (1), the intentional objects of (7) and (8) cannot be reformulated as sentential propositions, because they do not ascribe properties to anything. Rather, they themselves may correspond to properties, or to the events, particulars or states of affairs to which properties are ascribed. It would seem that there are many such nonsentential intentional objects. In fact, anything we can think of (literally), i.e. any concept we have, of going to the store, the number 3, the color purple, Vienna, the situation in Africa, and just about any other, may function as a nonsentential intentional object in a sentential proposition of the form, "I am thinking of ...." Other intentional attitudes, like that of intending to do something, are more restrictive in the range of objects they may take; but not because all such objects must be sentential. Indeed, a tentative inductive generalization may be in order: It is a rare intentional attitude indeed that takes intentional objects none of which resist reformulation as sentential propositions. 2.2. The Psychological Primacy of Nonsentential Intentional Objects It may seem that all nonsentential intentional objects could be reformulated sententially, as declarative categorical propositions prefixed by an existential quantifier that predicates intentional objects like those of (1), (7), or (8) as properties, thus: (9) (∃x)(x is ________ [to go to the store, the number 3, the situation 11 in Africa, etc.]) But first, this suggestion fails for the intentional objects of conative attitudes like intending, hoping, desiring, fearing, etc. For the reasons just explicated, to intend to go to the store is not semantically equivalent to intending that there be something that is (my) going to the store. For similar reasons, to desire a piece of pie is not the same as desiring that there be something that is a piece of pie; nor is hoping for good weather the same as hoping that there is something that is good weather; nor is fearing the plague the same as fearing that there is something that is the plague; and so forth. By asserting the independent existence of the intentional object, existential reformulations like (9) misrepresent such objects as ontologically and psychologically independent of the agent whose intentional object it is. Second, (9) is like any other sentential formulation in that it may simply fail to represent the facts of the agent's actual intentional attitude, even in the easier case of the cognitive attitudes of thinking, believing, perceiving, 11 I shall not address here the standard questions about whether the "is" in (7) is really the "is" of predication or the "is" of identity. © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
