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Show Chapter X. The Criterion of Inclusiveness 400 are informed by that theory." 9 But this objection can be avoided by simply distinguishing between beliefs, principles, and perceptions; and between mistaken perceptions and distorted perceptions. If I believe you are wrong to assert that I must keep my promises in a particular instance, my reason may be simply that your general principles are too provincial. I will regard your moral perceptions as correspondingly distorted only if they are saturated by your provincial general principles; but they may not be. For example, Huck Finn's moral perception that it would be wrong to turn in Jim the runaway slave was not distorted by his provincial general principle that aiding and abetting runaway slaves was a crime. (1) does not prescribe a single right way Smith ought to respond to Washington's allegations. For example, Smith might satisfy (1) either by engaging Washington in rational evaluation of the evidence for and implications of Vogeler's behavior, or by abdicating to the university ombudsman the role of moral mediator on the grounds that because Vogeler is a close friend of his, he is unable to render impartial judgment on this case. But (1) does sift out pseudorational tactics of the sort Smith deploys in suggesting that Washington is "seeing things" rather than seeing clearly the intrinsically offensive character of Vogeler's behavior. (1) also rules out any moral theory that withholds full membership in the moral community from certain adult groups on the grounds that they are, by nature or by ideology, not fully competent members of that community. I dissect such theories in Chapter XI, following. Moreover, (1) rules out any Anti-Rationalist moral theory that stipulates an agent's inclusion in one's family or circle of friends or local professional network as a necessary condition for full moral treatment of her. Finally, (1) eliminates any moral theory that justifies the devaluation or subversion of an agent's rational and evaluative faculties in order to influence his action - e.g. through coercion or manipulation. So, in particular, it eliminates Classical Utilitarianism as a viable candidate for practical moral adequacy; this conclusion underscores the argument made in Volume I, Chapter XII. Perhaps controversially, (1) implies that, in the event that the practical consequences of choosing one moral theory over another involve life and death - for example, if my rival's moral theory legitimates the killing or torture of heretics and infidels whereas mine does not, it is impermissible to deploy tactics of persuasion such as the killing or torture of my rivals, just because I anticipate their deploying those tactics against me. (1) does not exclude self-defense against one's rivals when necessary. But it does exclude any behavior that "sinks to the level" of reciprocally coercing moral assent through psychological or physical power plays against them. If the impasse between Smith's and Washington's moral theories regarding the import of Vogeler's behavior cannot be resolved without reliance on underhanded 9 Op. cit. Note 2. © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
