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Show Chapter X. The Criterion of Inclusiveness 384 for us as physical phenomena - i.e. as that about which third-person physicalistic judgments can be made - is predetermined by our cognitive apparatus: our evolving rational capacity to recognize sensory data as physical objects and events that are independent of ourselves as equally physical objects. There could be no theory-independent standard that provided us with guidance in identifying physical phenomena as physical, because there is no pre-rational way of identifying physical phenomena as physical, independent of the elementary concepts and judgments by which we begin to make our experience rationally intelligible. Just how rationally intelligible we make it is a function of whether or to what extent we craft a higher-level theory on the foundations of those elementary concepts. If "physical" is itself one of those elementary concepts, then contemporary research in particle physics instructs us as to just how primitive, theory-laden, and ultimately misguided it is. Analogously, what counts for us as moral phenomena is similarly predetermined by our cognitive apparatus: our evolving rational capacity to recognize sensory data as having moral import. Chapter IX sketched very briefly a commonsensical account of this process, and Chapter IV.8 argued that it is not inextricably tied to interpersonal relationships. There is similarly no theory-independent standard that might provide us with guidance in identifying moral phenomena as moral, because - as we have seen in considering the naïf - there is no pre-rational way of identifying moral phenomena as moral, independent of the elementary concepts and judgments - "good," "bad," "pleasant," "painful," and the like - by which we begin to make our experience morally intelligible. And we may similarly heighten the moral intelligibility of our experience by crafting a higher-level moral theory on the foundations of these concepts. In both the scientific and the moral cases, the difference between pre-reflective but theory-laden judgments and sophisticated theories is one of degree. In both cases, once we become aware of the theory-ladenness of our experience, we can then identify the strengths and limitations of that theory, and refine or expand it accordingly. The criterion of theoretical inclusiveness recommends that we seek always and on principle to expand its reach. 1.2. Inclusiveness Expanding the reach of a theory may require either reformulating its laws, or rethinking its application, or both. In the United States, the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) has been controversial in part because opponents see it as redundant, arguing that its provisions are already contained in or implied by the Constitution; whereas proponents see it as practically necessary, arguing that not all legitimate subjects with a valid claim to Constitutional protection are in fact afforded it. But in fact there is no necessary conflict here. It may be true both that the scope of the Constitution already implicitly includes women; and also that it may be practically © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
