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Show Chapter X. The Criterion of Inclusiveness 404 rectitude. We often disregard or belittle another's pain, or exclude it from the domain of moral concern, or give it only cursory attention or moral weight, simply because we disapprove of its hypothesized cause. We may judge the person to be oversensitive, or self-indulgent, or manipulative, or temperamental, or distorted in her perceptions. These are terms of evaluation that indicate that we are second-guessing the motive or causes behind the agent's expression of pain, and invoking this ad hoc hypothesis about the disreputable origins of that expression in character or circumstance in order to minimize its moral significance. This type of rationalization is highly vulnerable to the charge of moral arrogance just discussed. It is difficult to imagine what causal origin of pain could possibly justify taking the pain itself less seriously. Or it may happen that an agent passes such judgment on himself. He may not realize that he is a victim of moral transgression, even though the act itself causes him intense pain, because he believes he deserves it, or that the transgressive act is unexceptionable, or that it hurts the transgressor more than it hurts him. Or he may believe about the status of his own pain any of the dismissive judgments just mentioned, if he abdicates epistemic authority about his inner states to someone else who makes them. In these cases, (2) protects the victim of moral transgression against the loss of epistemic selfconfidence that often comes with being such a victim, by enjoining us to take his anguish very seriously, even if he himself does not. It might seem that Kant's own moral theory violates (2), by subordinating sensuous empirical reactions to the dictates of the categorical imperative; so that, for example, conscience may require Washington to tell Vogeler honestly that she does not appreciate his attentions, even though she knows that this will only cause him to retaliate against her with more offensive remarks to her and about her to others, which will increase her mental distress. By requiring her to tell Vogeler the truth when that will only intensify her pain, it might be argued, Kant's moral theory subordinates the full moral importance of that pain to the impartial duty to tell the truth. But in fact Kant's moral theory has no such implication. Among its imperfect duties is the duty to render aid to one in distress, and Kant acknowledges that an agent may have occasion to fulfill this duty by rendering aid to herself - as Washington does by protesting Vogeler's behavior to Smith. Although this does not abrogate Washington's perfect duty to tell the truth, it does not require that she allow herself to be treated by Vogeler as a sitting duck, either. (2) requires that Smith respect the moral importance of Washington's pain, but it does not prescribe a single, morally correct way he should act in order to do so. Of course there do exist moral theories that prescribe stiffupper-lipping it in response to felt mental anguish; Stoicism might be interpreted in this manner. But at best this is enjoined in response to one's own acknowledged pain, not in response to others' pain; and not, therefore, in response to the empathetic pain one may feel in response to others' pain. Nor © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
