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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conception 395 remarks that Vogeler makes about Washington to her male graduate students and to his male colleagues are as follows: that Washington does not know the literature well enough to teach her courses; that Washington does not like men; that only effeminate wusses befriend a ball breaker such as Washington; and that Washington is going to complain to the university administration about the department's treatment of her. Vogeler in fact consults the university's legal counsel himself as to how the department can get rid of Washington without incurring a discrimination lawsuit, and brags about this to his colleagues. Washington gets wind of these events, describes all of Vogeler's behavior to Smith, and asks Smith for help in putting an end to it. Smith replies blandly that all junior faculty find it difficult to "run the gauntlet" in order to get tenure; that he has known Vogeler since college; and that Washington is overreacting, seeing offense in Vogeler's behavior where none is intended. Clearly, Washington and Smith accept different moral interpretations of Vogeler's behavior. Washington condemns it as harassment, whereas Smith treats it as without moral import. Which of them is correct? Is Vogeler's behavior to be described as harassment, or as mere fraternal hazing? Is it possible to decide between them, or must we content ourselves with impotent musings on the subjective incompatibility of different worldviews? That mere different worldviews are not what is at issue is signaled by Smith's calling into question Washington's competence to make a considered moral judgment. By accusing her of overreacting, of taking Vogeler's behavior too seriously, Smith does more than suggest that Washington might be mistaken, in this instance, in her moral evaluation. A mere mistake in moral judgment can be corrected with added information or further reflection on the implications and consequences of action. It is susceptible to adjustment through the application of rational procedures of information-gathering and inference. Thus it can be revised within the framework of the substantive moral theory that the mistaken moral judgment presupposes. By contrast, if I react with vehement repugnance, upon learning of an African American man who has been beaten to death for venturing into a segregated European American neighborhood, it is because such an act violates my favored moral theory, i.e. my values. There is no mistake in judgment I have made that can be corrected by learning that this is common practice in many parts of the United States, or that the man was a drug addict, or by adjusting my stance to reflect my probable partiality as an African American. If an unsympathetic observer suggests that I am overreacting, seeing personal malice where none is intended - perhaps the murder is intended merely as an impersonal deterrent, to keep African Americans in their place - the implication is not only that my values are misplaced; but also that my capacity for moral judgment itself is therefore impaired. By disvaluing too strongly the practice of murdering African Americans who trespass onto European American territory, the observer might reason, I am © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
