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Show Chapter VI. Moral Interiority 280 unmediated personal relationship to Ellsworth as it does respect for my moral theory. Some might maintain that it is precisely the potential for ambivalence, or for a conflict between friendship and duty, that shows the fundamental defect of strictly impartial moral principles. That they might prescribe one course of action, and my natural inclinations another, reinforces the alienation that I claim is a straw man. But the problem is then not local to impartial moral prescriptions, but instead common to any morality - indeed, to any prescriptions of any kind that happen to diverge from what I am naturally inclined to do.15 If we think of a morality as, roughly, a way in which our actions and emotions are or should be regulated by the legitimate requirements of others, then the objection is, in fact, an objection to heeding those requirements at the expense of one's personal inclinations, and a complaint that one is not invariably encouraged to indulge them. Such a complaint is of course fully in keeping with the egocentric cast of the Humean conception, as well as with Nietzsche's motivational ideal of spontaneity discussed in Chapter V.6.1, above. But I argued in Volume I, Chapter VIII.3.2.4 that such a complaint in the end bespeaks narcissism of pathological dimensions. A motivationally effective moral imperative, then, ordinarily presupposes rather than precludes unmediated feelings of affection, compassion, or concern. So to be motivated to rescue Ellsworth first by respect for a moral imperative does not imply that my purpose in acting is to obey that imperative to the detriment of my overriding concern for Ellsworth, any more than being motivated by fear of the IRS to pay my taxes implies that my purpose in acting is to obey the IRS to the detriment of my overriding concern to pay my taxes. In both cases, my complex response to a perceived intentional object (the specter of the IRS, a friend's peril) includes a backwardlooking affectively motivating state (fear of the IRS, respect for the moral law) that motivates purposeful action (paying my taxes, rescuing Ellsworth first). 7.3. Moral Integrity So we can think of a morally integrated agent as one with a motivationally effective intellect whose moral theory constrains and is fully integrated into the concepts and principles constitutive of her perspective; satisfies the requirements of horizontal and vertical consistency over time and so is rationally intelligible to her; and is such that she recognizes herself in its principles. Furthermore, the character dispositions that these principles describe are sufficiently deeply instilled, preferably in the normal process of socialization, as to reinforce and strengthen the motivational efficacy of her Marcia Baron also makes this point in "The Alleged Repugnance of Acting from Duty," The Journal of Philosophy LXXXI, 4 (April 1984), 213. 15 © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
