| OCR Text |
Show Chapter IX. "Ought" 358 argue here that this view is mistaken; conveniently, Kant agrees. Kant characterizes a command as a "representation of an objective principle so far as it is necessitating for a will" (G, Ak. 413) - and, in particular, necessitating for an imperfect human will. But an objective principle by itself, he says, contains no imperative (G, Ak. 414). Therefore a command, for Kant, is an objective principle that necessitates human action without itself containing an imperative. My analysis is basically in accord with Kant's. As we saw in Chapter V.5.2, an ideal descriptive moral theory consists in principles in the indicative mood. A command is formed from the corresponding indicative merely by dropping the second-personal subject (or, in German, switching word order). Often the two moods are syntactically indistinguishable (in both languages); and a command has greater force when it is expressed as a categorical assertion or prediction of fact. One pervasive example of the use of the simple categorical indicative to issue unconditional commands is to be found in fashion copy: "Blouses have a touch of the poet, cascading over sheer pants in fine, fluid folds," Donna Karan tells us. "This is what's Right. Now." 2 Well, there's no arguing with that. Consider the parity of structure among the following utterances: (1) "This room will pass my inspection by the end of the day." (2) "You will never embarrass me in public again." (3) "That lout will not get another chance to ruin your party." (4) "I will never take another drink." The syntactical similarity of (1)-(4) suggests that commands are, in the second person, exactly what resolutions are in the first and third. They do not merely enjoin certain actions. They enforce a certain descriptive theory of reality, by flatly stating the facts as predicted by that theory. I argued in Chapter V.5 that Kant's moral theory is particularly well suited to do this because it fits as an intrinsic component into a more general, descriptive conception of reality the rational intelligibility of which enables us to preserve the unity and coherence of the self. Relative to this more general conception, the objective necessity with which Kant claims a law commands us is what I have been calling the authority of fact. Although it is theoretically open to us to disconfirm certain parts of the theory by disobeying some of its commands, we must not underestimate the psychological and conative force a theory of reality has when valorized by the authority of fact. For example, no one would deny the powerful connection between being told that one is ugly or stupid, and feeling ugly or stupid, despite one's better judgment. Similarly, when we are told authoritatively 2 The New York Times, Sunday, April 4, 1993, Section I, 5. © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
