| OCR Text |
Show Chapter X. The Criterion of Inclusiveness 402 what independent standard could we possibly appeal in order to ascertain this? No variant on the "Impartial Rational Spectator" would suffice. Suppose we could spell out the psychological and emotional makeup of some such "Emotional Rational Participant" on a statistical basis that at the same time corrected for gender, class, and ethnic bias, which is unlikely. We have already seen in Volume I, Chapter IV.1 that we still would have no means of making interpersonal comparisons among distress or happiness levels of different individuals. Therefore we would have no means of ascertaining to what extent the standard of the "Emotional Rational Participant" had been met in a particular case. In any event, the very idea of a common standard of appropriate emotional response, independent of appropriate conduct, is suspect. No one is exempt from sensitivities on a wide range of individual and idiosyncratic matters. These sensitivities may increase the intensity of one's emotional response beyond some local convention when those sensitivities are wounded: Sensitivity to one's height or weight, to being teased or not invited to parties, to one's class background or table manners or general condition of moral dereliction are just a few of the sore spots that may elicit a more vehement response than one's audience may have expected. In these cases we do not ordinarily think such a response is inappropriate relative to some emotional norm, unless it is patently self-destructive or morally costly to others - in which case the relevant norm is not emotional but moral. Instead we are reminded of how broad and inclusive the range of acceptable emotional responses may be, and we adjust our behavior accordingly so as not to give offense in the future. Unlike criteria of rationality, which are more or less uniform and applicable across a large variety of groups,10 emotional responses are not the kind of thing that meaningfully can be legislated across individuals. This is why Anti-Rationalist moral theories that insist on grounding moral behavior solely in some implied standard of correct moral emotion sometimes seem so arrogant. They presume to instruct us as to the sort of interior emotional life we all ought to lead in order to enjoy moral rectitude, as though acting from conscientious and well-intentioned motives toward others were not enough. The most serious objection to (a), then, is its moral arrogance. Smith simply is not in a position to presume knowledge of that level of mental distress that it would be morally justified for Washington to feel; and even if he were, he would have no business imposing that standard on Washington. Washington's level of mental distress may be greater than Smith is comfortable witnessing. It may be greater than Smith imagines he would feel In "African Traditional Thought and Western Science," (in Bryan Wilson, Ed. Rationality (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 131-171), Robin Horton furnishes convincing evidence for the cross-cultural validity of at least some fundamental norms of theoretical rationality. 10 © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
