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Show Chapter XI. Xenophobia and Moral Anomaly 450 severely strains our attempts to apply the principle of charity in making sense of it. Hence in order to understand the behavior of higher-order political discriminators, we must watch what they do, not what they say. For example, these attitudes may find expression in an expectation of greater deference or genuflection from a member of the disvalued group. The simple first-order political discriminator expresses his anger at the violation of this expectation in certain familiar stereotypes: the "uppity nigger" whose refusal to behave subserviently is seen as impudence or disrespect; or the "Jewish-American Princess," whose assertiveness, presumption of self-worth, and expectation of attention and respect is seen as a sign of being spoiled, selfish, or imperious. But for the higher-order political discriminator, such anger is displaced into more subtle but similar reactions: Such an individual may just feel angered or personally affronted by a woman's presumption of equality - in personal, social, or intellectual status, or professional worth, or as a competitor for social or professional rewards; or unduly irritated by her failure to defer or back down in argument. She may be viewed as forward in conversation, when in fact she contributes no more and no less than anyone else; or stubborn, unresponsive, or impervious to well-intentioned criticisms, when in fact the only acceptable response to those criticisms, in the eyes of the higher-order political discriminator, would be for her to concur with them wholeheartedly and apologize for her dereliction. Or, to take another example, the higher-order political discriminator may feel invaded or compromised by an African American's jocularity or willingness to trade friendly insults that one accepts as a matter of course from those considered to be one's peers. The African American may be viewed as overly familiar, insolent, or presumptuous. In all such cases, the disvaluee's behavior is seen as a presumption, not a right or an accepted practice. The view of the disvaluee's assumption of equality as a presumption may explain the higher-order political discriminator's otherwise inexplicable umbrage at being complemented by a disvaluee: An inferior is in no position to confer favors of any kind. Thus the higher-order political discriminator is tortured by the suspicion that he is somehow being ridiculed, or shown insufficient respect, or that the disvaluee's conduct bespeaks contempt. In a compelling analysis of anger,8 N. J. H. Dent suggests that anger is based ultimately on feelings of personal inferiority: These lead one to overestimate the importance of others' expressions of regard and esteem for one, which in turn multiplies the number of occasions upon which one feels slighted or demeaned when such expressions are not forthcoming, or of insufficient magnitude relative to one's importunate requirements. I argued in Volume I, Chapter II.2.4 that feelings of inferiority were a necessary N. J. H. Dent, The Moral Psychology of the Virtues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 155-160. 8 © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
