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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conception 365 attractive enough. But a person who morally dislikes herself has no internal psychological resources for withstanding the unwarranted accusations of others, for their condemnation and rejection of her then merely reinforces her condemnation and rejection of herself as an unworthy individual. She implicitly concurs with their verdict of her as guilty, alien, and debased. Thus by morally disliking herself, she allies all of her psychological and emotional resources of moral judgment - anger, contempt, outrage, resentment, shame - with those of her community and against herself. The chasm within the self created by this radical conflict between behavior and moral self-assessment demands resolution; and there are several options. For example, cooperative condemnation by the authority of fact, consensus and reward provides a readily accessible one. By ascribing to the agent a theoretical representation of her as morally unworthy, these forms of social sanction encourage her to regard herself similarly, and move her to confirm this revised self-conception in her behavior. Blanket social condemnation thus becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, and the agent a selfprofessed outcast whose destroyed or debased self-conception itself honorifically affirms her further moral delinquency. Unethical or criminal behavior becomes a badge of honor that accords additional weight to her revised self-conception; and this, in turn, provides additional legitimacy for her behavior. In tandem these two are mutually reinforcing. This is the case in which, through the original impetus of social conditioning, rational autonomy develops decisively decoupled from aspirations to moral rectitude. It is for this reason that I suggested, in Chapter VII.2, that a destroyed or debased selfconception makes an agent dangerous but not necessarily irrational. It is not irrational to believe of oneself what the authority of fact, consensus and reward prescribe, nor to act accordingly even if such action violates moral principle. Alternative, less radical resolutions of the split between behavior and moral self-assessment are no less uninviting. The danger and diminishing marginal utility of self-obliteration - for example, through drugs, alcohol, or other addictions; and the sheer discomfort of radical moral reform through concerted and painful behavioral reconditioning both threaten either a punishing physical and psychological ordeal, or else an otherwise destructive alienation from self of large dimensions. Thus it is not surprising that we marshal every rational and psychological resource we have, in order to avoid recognizing this split, even where there is evidence for doing so. We may, for example, rationalize our failure to keep the promise by arguing that we did not utter the performative that would make it one; and similarly rationalize away the promisee's accusation or reproach by ascribing to him a personal axe to grind. Or we may dissociate our behavior, claiming that our promise was the result of momentary thoughtlessness that no one should have taken seriously; or we may © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
