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Show 151 mainstream parties, and testing the strategic interaction model which posits that variation will be best explained by looking at how strategies play out in a given socioeconomic and institutional context. Considerable insight was gained from the former, adding in the strategic choices facing niche parties. For instance, niche parties should tread with caution when it comes to joining an electoral alliance or participating in a governing coalition, as these were not found to increase their electoral success. Despite these findings, when faced with these decisions, niche parties, in reality, still often choose to participate in electoral alliances and governing coalitions when the opportunity presents itself. There are fewer instances when niche parties have declined invitations, so perhaps the advice for niche parties is to recognize that not all "opportunities" are such. As for the strategic interaction model, the results served more as a compass pointing in the direction of how to better fine-tune the components used to test the model rather than unequivocal support for the model. While I now know that the interaction terms need altering, I was unable to do so for this project due to data limitations. This chapter will further elaborate on these points and proceeds by discussing five central findings or themes from this project: 1) Niche party strategies: A missing piece of the puzzle; 2) Mainstream party strategies: Actions speak louder than words; 3) Socioeconomic conditions: What do parties versus voters know?; 4) Interactions: More work to be done; and 5) Where, who, and the EU: Secondary themes with potential. Finally, in thinking more broadly, the findings of this project contribute to understanding more of the nuances surrounding niche parties, which is critical for electoral studies in the face of continually changing party systems. As voters become less aligned and grow detached from mainstream parties, this provides an opportunity for |