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Show 71 addition, the DF entered into a coalition government in 2001 as the third largest parliamentary group (Bjørklund and Andersen 2002; Bolleyer 2013). The Progress Party, even during its zenith as the second largest parliamentary group, was never invited to join a coalition. Hence, it is not only the sheer number of political parties competing in elections that can affect the results, but also the type of competition. Within the strategic cluster, there are aspects to capture both what mainstream parties can do and also what niche parties can do, which is a contribution of this project. The strategic choices of niche parties encompass how dedicated they remain to their "big" issue over time, participation in a governing coalition, participation in an electoral alliance, and competition from other parties, especially rival or splinter parties. The decision to splinter, often a result of party in-fighting or disagreements over policy, strategies, and having participated in a governing coalition seem to, from the examples examined in this chapter, hinder electoral success, while participation in an electoral alliance and maintaining a certain level of dedication to the "big" issue seem to aid in maintaining or increasing levels of electoral success. In addition to examining the strategies of niche and mainstream parties individually, I also attempt to capture the interaction of strategies, a central tenant of my strategic interaction model. Overall, adding in agency for niche parties and looking at the strategies of all parties will offer insight and a deeper understanding of niche party success. Conclusion There are three main variable clusters whose factors are hypothesized to explain variations in the success of niche parties: institutional, socioeconomic, and strategic. |
