| OCR Text |
Show 57 but instead focus only on mainstream parties. In their models, the electoral fortunes of niche parties depend on the decisions of their mainstream competitors (Adams et al. 2006; Bolleyer 2013; Givens 2014; Meguid 2005; Meguid 2008; Spoon 2011). In his article, Pardos-Pardo emphasizes "the role of mainstream parties in limiting the opportunity structure of radical entrepreneurs" and tests "the specific micromechanisms allowing moderate center-right parties to limit anti-immigrant niche party success based on the immigration issue" (2015, 365). In contrast, my strategic interaction model treats all parties as dynamic actors who can shape and be shaped by their own decisions and the actions of other parties within the context of institutions and socioeconomic conditions. Both mainstream parties and niche parties have the ability to operate in a given context and choose their strategies, which may interact and also may change from one election to the next. I do not assume that both mainstream and niche parties are equally influential, but the strategic decisions of niche parties are part of the political process and need to be included. Incorporating agency for niche parties is part of my contribution to the research and literature in this field. The indicators included in the strategy cluster are: choices by leaders of mainstream parties to recognize or dismiss the substantive "big" issue(s) of the niche party, the actions by the niche party to maintain or broaden its platform, the interaction of the mainstream and niche parties' platform on the "big" niche issue(s), experience participating or supporting a governing coalition, the decision to run as part of an electoral alliance, and the number of political parties competing in elections, which includes the presence of rival parties. |
