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Show 1884.] OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND OF THE SPECIES. 463 As every object of study is made clearer by contrasting it with other objects distinct in kind from it, so our " instinctive actions " may be more clearly apprehended by contrasting them with such of our actions as are said not be "instinctive." But we habitually conl rast "Instinct" with "Reason." What, then, are the characters which distinguish actions which are attributed to " Reason " 1 Now reasonable," "consciously intelligent" conduct, is understood by all men to mean conduct in which there is a more or less wise adaptation of means to ends-a deliberate adaptation, not one due to accident only. No one would call an act done blindly a reasonable intelligent action on the part of him who did it, However fortunate might he its result. Our highest mental activity, our type of reason, consists of conscious, deliberate, intellectual perceptions-explicit judgments-and our reasonable actions are actions performed in accordance therewith. But besides these actions due to our self-conscious intellect, there are a variety of other actions-such e. g. as our respiratory actions - which we ordinarily perform without advertence, though we can, if we will, perform them with self-conscious deliberation. Again, we may, when our mind is entirely directed upon some external object, or when we are almost in a state of somnolent unconsciousness, have but a vague feeling of our existence-a feeling resulting from the unobserved synthesis of our sensations of all orders and degrees. This imintellectual sense of self may be conveniently distinguished from intellectual " Consciousness " as " Consentience}' l Nothing is more common with us than to experience modifications of our organs of sense to which our intellect in no way adverts. Such modifications constantly influence our actions (as in walking and running) without our ever adverting to them, either at the time of their occurrence or afterwards. W e may also, as everybody knows, suddenly recollect sights or sounds which were quite unnoticed at the time we experienced them ; yet our very recollection of them proves that they must, nevertheless, have affected our sensonum. Such unnoticed modifications of our sense-organs may, at least provisionally, be called " uufelt sensations." According to our preliminary definition and according to general usage, actions, whether adverted to or not, cannot be called " instinctive " unless they are generally useful ones directed to the accomplishment of wttforeseen ends. But it is a familiar fact that we often perform such actions. As examples of the kind may be enumerated :-spontaneous, instantaneous actions directed to the warding off of a blow or to the due maintaining of the body's balance. W h o also has not experienced how much better such actions are performed (as e. g. the action of running up stairs) with the mere aid of consentience, than when our intellect is brought to bear upon our motions? The little boy as yet unable, or hardly able to speak, has no expectation of future encounters when he begins unconsciously to grasp at weapons ; and long before the little girl can represent to 1 A term I believe first introduced by the late Mr. G. H. Lewes. |