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Show APPENDIX VI VI-53 48 COLORADO RIVER STORAGE PROJECT Principle 4 No comment. Principle 6 This principle would appear to have the United States make the present generation of Hoover contractors "whole" during the "filling" period as to power and energy which would have heen generated at Hoover in the absence of impoundments at Glen Canyon, Flaming Gorge, Nuvajo, and Curecanti Dams. There are details, however, which hear inspection. The effects of evaporation at these reservoirs is not to he included in the "allowance" made by the United States for impairment of Hoover production. In actual fact, Glen Canyon, Flaming Gorge, and Curecanti are, and will be for many years, purely power projects performing no irrigation or other consumptive use function. Use of water incident to power production has, as you know, the lowest of priorities, and the rights of one basin against the other for water for such use are obscure. This principle would give the upper basin the superior right to such use of water. Arizona considers this an area of possible compromise, but cannot acquiesce in this element of this principle as written. Allowance for Hoover impairment might be accomplished bv the Secretary delivering lieu power and energy at Hoover Power iPlant or other mutually acceptable points. The sources of that lieu power and energy are not clearly stated. Ostensibly, the sources are Glen Canyon, Flaming Gorge, and Curecanti in the upper basin. These cannot furnish lieu power and energy while collecting dead storage and simultaneously impairing Hoover generation. Commissioner Dominy uses the terms "Federal powerplants," and "Federal projects." There has been disturbing speculation that the Bureau of Reclamation contemplates the use of Davis and Parker Power Plants to supply lieu energy, and the reluctance of the Bureau to renew Parker-Davis contracts has given weight to this speculation. Such operation would, so far as meeting Arizona's power needs are considered, amount to a substantial diminution of Arizona's power supply. This speculation should be resolved by the Bureau, and must be before Arizona could consider acquiescence. The Secretary could provide lieu energy by purchase from others. Apparently sufficient kilowatt-hours are available for purchase within Arizona. Such purchase implies legal authority and appropriations available to the Secretary, and the criteria nowhere provide assurance that these are or will be available to him. Present indications are that lieu kilowatt capacity will not be available for purchase by the Secretary or Arizona should Hoover capacity be impaired. This matter will be discussed further in connection with principle 7. Under this principle, the Secretary might make direct monetary payments to the separate allottees, in amounts "equal to the incremental cost of generating substitute energy." Arizona assumes that "incremental cost" is used here in the sense that if Hoover energy might have cost Arizona 3.5 mills per kilowatt-hour delivered, and if Arizona paid 5.0 mills for lieu energy delivered, the Secretary would pay Arizona 1.5 mills toward that cost, and relieve Arizona of a commensurate share of Hoover charges. If this is not the meaning intended, the Bureau should make its intent clear. Again, there is no |
