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Show VI-52 UPDATING THE HOOVER DAM DOCUMENTS colorado river storage project 47 commknts on general principles to govern, and operating Criteria for, Glkn Canyon Reskkvoik (Lake Powell) and Lake Mead Diking the Lake Powell Filling Period, June 13, 1961 ARIZONA POWER AUTHORITY AND, ARIZONA INTERSTATE STREAM COMMISSION Principle 1 The "reasonable discretion" of this principle must be read along with Commissioner Dominy's foregoing of a "legalistic approach" as set out in the sixth paragraph of his communication of June 13, 1961, to the Secretary of tlie Interior. Arizona, and other Hoover allottees, have always been ready to compromise reasonably toward a practical means of getting Glen Ganyon into fruitful operation, but the Arizona Power Authority has, in total effect, contracted away to others the total of Arizona's share of Hoover generation. Can the authority acquiesce in the impairment of that share without becoming liable, legally, to its contractors? "Legalistics" cannot be dismissed lightly. Principle S This principle is suggestive of two implications. The first is the date of May 31, 10S7. Quite obviously, this is the date on which the Hoover allottees cease to be able to lean upon their Hoover contracts for defense against adverse operations by the Secreta^ upstream. Arizona, California, and Nevada may reasonably have interests in Hoover beyond the expiration of current contracts, and subordination of Hoover toward easing possible repayment problems in the upper basin would be prejudicial toward those interests. As you know, there is interest in establishing a lower basin account, with Hoover as the most substantial element; the Bureau of Reclamation and Arizona have exhibited the most interest. Subordination of Hoover would affect a lower basin account adversely. Finally, Congress has an interest in Hoover repayment extending beyond 1987, in that there remain for repayment substantial items of costs, such as unliquidated Boulder City municipal costs, unliquidated costs ascribed to equipment installed after 1937 on a 50-year payout basis, and the flood control allocation of $25 million (unless Congress acts to wipe out that obligation). Subordination of Hoover after 1987 would result in slower payout of Hoover than indicated to Congress at the time of authorization. Accordingly, neither Arizona nor the Congress can acquiesce in criteria still, after several years, silent as to operating rules holding after the "filling" period, or after 1987. The second disturbing implication of this principle is that the Secretary may declare these criteria no longer applicable at any time at liis discretion, after consultation with upper and lower basin interests. Note that onlv consultation, not agreement, is requisite to a substitution of criteria presently unknown. Arizona cannot afford to acquiesce, uninformed as to the ensuing criteria. If the Secretary were to offer a 5-year notice prior to his changing operating rules, this element of the criteria would be much more palatable. Principle S No comment. |
