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Show f(eajon. Book IV. it \\•ith the other : anct~1•here there. be many Medium<, there the danger <1f the Minake is the greater, and confequently it may be liable to the greater uncertainty. But yet whrre the Mind clearly retains the Intuition it had of the Agreement of any Idea wrth another , and that witli a third, and that \vith a fourth, f!Jc. there the Agreement of the firn and the fdhrth is a Demonnration, and produces certain l{nowledgc, which may be called Ratibhal Knowledge, as the other is Intuitive. ~· t6. Secondly, 'there are other !dear, whofe Agreement, or Difagreemel1t, can no othetwife be judged of, but by the intervention of others; which have not a certain Agreement with the Extremes, but an ufual or likely one : and in thefe it is, that the Judgment is properly exercifed, which is the acttuiefcing of the Mind, that any Ideas do agree, by com" paring them with fuch probable Mediums. And this, though it never amounts to Knowledge, no not to that which is the lowefi degree of it; yet forhetimes the iht~:m~iate Ideas tie the Extremes fo firmly toge" th<ir; and the Probabrlrty rs fo clear and firong, that Alfent as neceffa• rily follows it, ~s Knbwledge does Dcmonnration. The great Excellen• cy and Ufe of the Judgment, is to obferve Right, aqd take a true efiimat~ bf the force and weight of each Prol:abihty; and then caning them up all right togetliet, i:hufe that fide which has the over-balance. 9.17. ·l•t•ithJe Knowledge, is the perception of the certain Agreement, t>r Dif.1greement ofhvo Ideas immediately compared together. RJtlo~al l(llowledf.r!, is the perception ol the certain .1\greement, or Dif• bgroc!inelitofany two Ideas, by the intervention of one or more othet JdsHl. · juJgmed, i~ the thinking or taking tll'o !dear to agree, ot difagrec; by the rnt'!:r~entJon bf bne ot more .lrleas, whofe certain rigreement, ot dlfagrtemedt with them, it does not perceive, but hath obferved to be fre· quent and utual. I ~. 18. Though thededucing one Propofition from another, or making l•f'rences m Wordr, be a great part of Reafon, and that which it isufually employ'd about: yet the· principal Ac.l: ofRatiocihation is the finding the .1\grecment, or Drfagreement bf two Ideas one with another, by the Jnrcrvcntron of a thrrd.. As a Man' by a y anj, finds tWO Houfes to be ·of thefame length, wluch could not be brought together to tneafure their Equality bYJ•xro-pofitlon. Words have their Con!equences, as the ligns offuch JdeaJ : and Thmgs, agree or difagree, as really they are; but we obfct-.ve It on! y by our i.tw. ~' 19. &fore we quit this Subject, it may be 1\>otth our \Vhile a little to rene<!!' on four .(<>Hs ~f Argument<, that Men in their Ji.ea(onings witl1 -oth~rs do ordrnanly make ufe of, to prevail on their Alfent . or at lean fo to ~ve them, as l:o lilence their Oppofition. ' . Flrjl, The firli: i~, toalleege tire Opinions of Men, whofe Parts, Lear! nrng, Emmency~ Power, or lome other caufe, has gained a Reputation to, and fetled rn the common efl:eem with fome kind of Authority. When M~n are ~fl:allliflled in any kind of Dignity, 'tis thought a breach -of Medeny for others to derogate any 1~ay fi·om it, and quenion the -AuthotJt)' '01 Mt~ who arc m pofftfhon ot it. This is apt to beccnfured, <rs canyrll~ WJth rt too much 'Of Prrde, when a Man does not readily varl i'o the Oprn•ons c;>f a)'pro\'cd Aut hors , which have been received with -refpeC.t and fuli>m•rtioh by othm; and 'tis looked upon as info!ence, for a Man t~ fet up,and adhere t? Ius own Opinion, againn the current nream 'of Anlrqurty, or to put rt m t'he balance aaainn that of fome learnod DoCtor, or otherwtfe approved Writer. Wl;;,e~·er bae'l!s his Tenets with fuch Chap. XVII. Reafon. fuch Authorities, thinks he ought thereby to c.1rry the Cauie, and is ready to nyle rt Impudence many one wlro 01011 non,l out againfl:thent This ] think, may be called Arg,umen!um at! J?erec/{lu!J."W'· 1 Secondly,§. ~o. A~other way that Men ordinarily ule to drive othefs,and force them to lubmr~ therr Judgmcnts,and receive the Opinion in dcbate,is to require the Adveriary to admrt wh't thcyalledae as a Proo( or to affiu11 a better. And this I call Arg,umcn:um ad -<~norantfam. ) . 0 ~. 21 . Thirdly, A t hird way is, to prefs a Man with Confcquences drawn from his own Princrples, or Conccmons. This is already known un• der the Name of Arf!..ume11t11m nrl 1-Jominem. ~.n . rourtbly, The fourth is, the uiing of Proo!S drawn from any of the Foundations of l{nowledge, or Probability T his I call ,-lrg,umwtttm ad Judicium, T his alone ot all the fou r, brings true !nil ruction with it, nr:d advances-trs- in ourway to 1\nowhlge. For, 1. It argues not another Man's Opinion to be rrglu, becaufe I out ol lefpecr, or any other conlidcration, cut that of conviCtion, will cot contradiCt him. >. It proves net another Man to be rn the nglu way, nor that I ought to take the fame with him, becaufe I know not a better. 3· Nor does it follow, that another Man is in the right way, becaule he has !hewn me, that I am i<1 the wrong. I may be modcft, and therefore not oppofe another Man's l,'erfuafion: I may be ignoram, and not be able to produce a better: I may be in an Errour, and another may fl1ew me that I am fo. This may difpofe me, perhaps, fort he reception of Truth, but helps me not to it : That muft come from Proofs and Arguments, aod light ariling from the nature of Things themfel ves, and hot from my Shamefacednefs, Ignorance, or Errour. 9. 23. By what has been before faid of Reajoll, we may be able to make fume guefs at the diniocrion of Things, into thofe that are according to, above, and contrary to Reafon. 1. Accort!ing to Reafon are fuch Propofrtions, whofe Truth we can difcover, by examining and tracing thofe Ideas ~;•e have from Senfation and Re./lexio• ; and by natural deduCtion, ~nd to be true, or probable. >. Above Rea jon are lt1ch Propofitions, w hofe Truth or Probability we cannot by Reafon derive from thofe Principles. 3· Contrary to, Reajon are fuch Propolitions, as arc inconfrntnt with, or irreconcileable to our clear and dilliner !deus. Thus the Exinence of' one G 0 D is according to lieafon ; the Exinence of more than one {>0 D, contrary to Realon ; the Rcfurret-'tion of the Body after death, above Rcafon. Above Reafon alfo may be taken in a double fenfe, viz. Above Probability, or above Certainty; and in that large fenfe alfo, Con• trary to Reafon, is, I fuppofe, fometimes taken. · 9. '4· There is another ufe of the word Reuj"n, wherein it is oppofed to FJit!J: which though it be in it felf a very improper way of fpeaking,yet common Ufe has fo authorized it, that it would be folly either to oppofe or bope to remedy it: Only I think it may not be amifs to take notice, that however Faitlr be oppo!Cd to Reafon, Faith is nothing but a finn Alfent of the Mind; which if it be regulated, as is our Duty, cannot [;e afforded to any tiring but u~n good Rcafon ; and fo can nor be oppofite to· it. He that belreves, WJthout havmg any Reafon for behevmg, may be in love with his own FonfJes; but neither feeks Truth as he ought, nor pays the Obedience due ro his Maker, 11 ho would have him ufe thofe difcerning faculties he has given him, to keep him out of Miilake and Erronr. He that does not this to the ben ol his power , however he (Ometimes li<>hts on Truth, is in the right but by chance : and I know net whether ~he luckinefs of the Accident, will excufe the irregularity of Y y 2 his 3+7 |