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Show Names of Subftances. Book III. 9. 13. But to return to the Species of corporeal Subllances. If I Jh ~uld ask anyone whether fee and Water were two dill ina Species of Things, 1 doubt not' but I Jhould be anfwered in the affirmative: And it cannot be denied, but he that fays they are two dillinct: Species, is in the right.' But jf an Englifh-man, bred in Jamaica, who, perhaps, had never fecn nor' heard offcc, coming into England in the Wi11ter, find the Water he put in his Bafon nt night, in a great part frozen in the morning ; and not knowing any peculiar name it l~ad,fhould call it harden'd Water; T'ask,Whether this would be a new Spec1es to htm,ddferent from Water? And, lthmk, tt would be anfll'ered here, It would not to him be a new Species, no more than congealed Gelly,when it is cold,is a difiinCI:Species,from the fumeGelly fluid afld warm; or than liquid Gold,in the Fornace, is a dillinCI: Species from hard Gold in the Hands of a.Workman. And if this be fo, 'tis plain, that our dijlinfl Spcci'S, arenotbing but diflinfl complex Ideas, with dif/ini/ Nam.s annexed to them. 'Tis true, every Subfl:anr.c that ex ills, has its peculiar Confl:itution, whereon depend thofe fenlible ~1alities, and Powers, ,we obferve in it': But the ranking of ThiHgs into Species, which is nothing but forting them undcrfeveral Titles, is done by us, according to the Ideal that we have of them; Which though fufficient to difhnguilh them by Names; fo that we ma.y be able to difcourfc of them, when we have them not prefentbefore us: yet if we fuppofe it to be done by their real internal Confl:itutions, and that Things exifl:ing, are dillinguifhed, by Nature, into Species by real EITences, according as we difl:inguifh them into Species by Names, we fhall be liable to great Mifl:abs. 9. 14. To difl:inguifh fubfiantial Beings into Species', according to the ufual fuppofition, that there are certain precifel EITences or Forms of Things, whereby 'all the Individuals exifl:ing, are, by Nature, difl:inguilhed into Species, thefe Things are neceffary: §. r 5. Firf/, To be alfured, thdt Nnture, in the produCI:ion of Things, always deligns them to partake of certain regulated efl:ab!ifl1ed Elfences, which are tc> be the Models of all Things to be prodqced. This, in that crude fenfe,tt IS ufuallypropofed,would need fome betterexplication,before it can fully be aJfented to. §. 16. Secondly, It would be neceffary to !mow, whether Nature al~ vays attains that Elfence, it defigns in !he produCI:ion of Things. The uregular and monfirous B1rths, that In divers forts of Animals have been obferved,will always give us reafon to doubt of one or both ofthefe. ~. 17. 7hirdly, It ought to be determined, whether tl10fe we call Monfl: ers, be really a difl:inct: Species, according to the fchblafiick notion of the word SpecieJ; iince it is certain, that every thing that exills, has its ,particular Confl:1tut1on : And yet we find, that fome of thefe monfirous 1'rodud:ions, have few or none of thofe Q9alities, which are fuppofed to refult from, and accompany the Elfence of that Species, from whence they denve thetr Ongtnals, and to wh1ch, by their defcent they feem to belong. ' Y· r8. FourtMy, The real EITences ofthofe Things, which we difiill" gmfh mto Spectes, and :tS fo dillinguifl1ed, we name, ought to be known; t. e. we ~ught to have Ideas of them. But fince we are ignorant in thefe four pomts,. the fuppojed real Ef{ences of 7hings, jl.md us 11ot i11 fi end, for the dif/mgui/hrng So~flances into Species. 9: 19. Fifthly, The o~ly imaginable help in this cafe, would be, that !1avmg framed perfect: complex Ideas, of the Proflerties of Things, flow· ~ng from thetr d11fere~t real EITen~, we fhould thereby dillinguifl1 them Into Spec1es. But ne1ther can thtS be done : for being ignorant of the real Chap, VI. Names oj Subftances.; real Effence it felf, it is impollible to know all thofe Proper:ies, that flow Jiom it, and nre fo annexed to it , that an):' one of them bemg away, .we iltly certainly concluJe, that that Elfence IS not there, and fo t?e Thmg is not of that Species. We can never know what are the precJfe number of Propertie~, depending on the real Elfcnce of Gold, any one of which failing the real Elfence of Gold, and confequently Gold, would not be there 'unlefS we knew the real EITence of Gold it felf, and by that tletermined that Species. By the Word Gold here, l "!ufl: be underfiood ,to defigna p1tticularpiece ofMatter; '?·:!,· t~~ la.fl: G?tnea that was com d. ··or If it lhould fl:and hete in its ordmary S1~mficatton for t~at complex ftlea, \l•hich I, or any one elfe calls G?ld; r. e. for the nominal EITe~ce of Gold, it wouljl be Jargon: fo hard IS 1t, to ~ew the v•nous meanmg and imper!eetiorl of Words, when we have nothwg elfe but Words to do It b~.y .~ o. By all which it is clear, T IJ at our a'r;,n.r·? gut· fhm· g S uo!n,.a nces z·n to Sp!cieS by Names, is not at all founded on t!mr .real EfTe~ces; nor call we pretend to range, and determme them exaCI:ly mto Spec1es, accordmg to lhteri1al elfential differences. . , § >I But filite as is aforefaid, we have need of general Words, tho we khoW not the ;eal EITences of Things; all we can do, is to collect: fuch a humber of limple Ideas, as by Examination, we lind to be umted to~elher irt Things exifl:ing, and thereof to make one complex; Ide~; whtch though It be hot the real EITence of any Subfl:ance that extfl:s, IS ):'et :be [J>.ci}ck EfTence, to which our Name belongs, and IS c~mverttble With It; Y,y which we tnay at Jeafl: try the Truth of thefe nomt~al EITences. F~r l!'xalhple, there be that fay, that the Elfence of Body IS Extenlion: If 1t lle fo we cah never mifiake, in putttng the Elfence of any thing for the 'r'hing it felf. Let us then in Difcourfe, put Extenfion for Body; and when \vewould fay, that Body moves, let us fay, that Extenfion moyes, and fee how it w1lllook: And he that fhould fay, that one Extenfion, by ln:jlulfe moves another Extenfion, would,. by the bare Expreffion, fullicl~ ntly lllew the abfurdity of fuch a. Notton. The Elfence of any dung, ill tefpeet of us, is the \vhole complex !tie a, compreh~nded and marked by that Name . and rn Subfl:ances, befides the feveral d1fimCI: iimple !dear that make ;hem up the confufed one of Subftance, br of an unknown Support and bi.ufe 'of their Union, is always a part : And. therefore th~ Effence of Body is not bare Extenfton, but an ':l'tended fohd thmg ; an foto fay, an extended folid thing moves, or ~mpels another,,IS all one, and as intelli ible, as to fay, Body moves, or.Jmpels. L1kew1fe, to fay-, that a ration!t!l.nimalis capable of Converfat~on, JS all of~stoJa:>:'~~ Man. But no one will fay, That Rationality IS capable o . nve at!..,..... litcalife it makes not the whole Elfence, to whtch we g1ve the Name M§~~ •. There are Creatures in the World, that have fhapes like ours, b~ are l1airy, and want Language, and Reafon. ;[h~re aren~"}~~~s ~f~l~:m bs, that have perfect:ly our fhape, but '_"ant . ea o~'}Jes enes Authom11 language too. There ate Creatures, as tishfald,lh~~ld be Inch ) that with but there appears no contradiCI:ton, that th ereTh' . g . ng' with ours bnguage and Reafor1 and a fl1ape In ot er mgs a :reel h ' have hairy Tails . oth~rs where the Males have no BeardJj ;;.d ot ~~ where th'e Fe-'al~s have If it be asked, whether thefe be a 1en, or . ' all <if buinane" "S pecies ; ; t1.s Jilau. 1, tli e r'-.< .!.! ~ fl.: .1 00 fe fher s only to t Je noml- W d Man or -tho nal Ellb'ice, For thofe to whom the definmon ° t e M ~d the .,. toiilple'x 'Idea, fignlfied by that Name, agrees, -they are en, a · ther 215 |
