OCR Text |
Show 8 No i~nate Principler in the Mind. Book' I. § r.4 Bu t Sec'o:na:>Jr'·' , \'" ere it true' that· the prccifc t1im ev or:f t,h,.e iRr be.ri;n g kno~n ·and affcnt to, were, when Men ~ome to t 1c . 1 e ~1 ea-!on; · h . ' ld that rove them innate. Tlus way of argmn!? ts as fnvo-nl Cit cnrous (,!on of it fclf is falfc. For by what kiild ot Logick will .ous,as ne 1 uppo ''Notion is Originally by Nature imprinted in the It appear, t Jat any c · fi ft b obferved and Mind in its firft Conftitution, becaute It com~s r to . c . . ' ' ~!Tented :o, when a. Faculty of the Mind, w!uch has qu1tc a dtftmct I ro- . ce tegins to exert it felf? And therefore, the c~mmg to . the ufe of ~~~c~h, if it were fuppofed the time, that thefe Maxtms are lirft affented tg (which it may be with as much Truth, as the ttmc when Men come to the ufe of Reafon) would be as good a Proof that they were mnate,as to fay they are innate becaufe Men affent to them,, when they. come to the ufe of Reafon. I agree then with thefe Men of mnate Pnnctpks,that there is no !\now ledge of thefe general and fclf.ev1dent Maxtms 10 the Mind, till it comes to the Exercife of R~fon : but I deny th"t the coming to the ufc of Reafon, is the p.rCCife ttme when they ~re firft taken notice of; and that if it were, that tt would prove them mnate. A!l that can with any Truth be meant by· this l'ropolit!On, That M~n a{/eNt to them when they come to the ufe of. Reafon, IS no more but th1s, That the making of general ab!lract Ideas, and the Underftandmg of general Names, being a Concomitant of the ranonal Faculty, ~nd growmg up with it, Children commonly get not thofe generalide_a s, nor learn the Names that fl:and for them, till having for a g?od W!ule extrclfed thm Rc1fon about familiar and more particular Ideas, they are by thetr ordinary Difcourfe and Actions ·with others, ackno:vledged to be capable of rational Converfation. If affenting to thefe Ma~tms, when Me~ come to the ufe of Reafon, can be true in any other Sene;, I delire 1t may be fl1ewn; or at leaft, how in this , or any other Sence 1t pro;es them innate. . . . . 1 , d fu ·n 1 §. x 5. The Senfes at firft let m parttcular lae~ s, an . rnt 1.t 1e yet empty Cabinet: And the Mind by degrees growmg famdm With fame of them, they are lodged m the Memory, and Names got to them. Afterwards the Mind proceeding farther, ab!lracts them, and by Degrees learns the ufe of general Names. By this man~er the Mind comes to be furnith'd with Idea's and Language, the Matenals about wluch to exe:cife its difcurlive Faculty: And the ufe of Reafon becomes dat!y more VI: Iible, as thefcMaterials, that give it Ernployment,mcreafc. But though the having of general Idea's, and the ufe of general Words and Rcafon ufually grow together; yet, I fee not, how thisany way pr~vcs then~ innate. TheKnowledgeoffome Truths,I confefs,ts very early m theMmd; but in a way that fl1ews them no; to be 1~mare. for,1f we wtll obferve,we tha!l find it ftill to be about Idea,, not mnate, but acqmred : It bemg about thofe firft, which are imprinted by external Things, with which_ Infants have eatlie!l: to do, and which make the mofl: frequent Impre!l1ons on their Senfes. · In Idea's, thus got, the Mind difcovers, That fome agree, and others differ, probably as foon as it has any ufe of Memory.; as foon as it is able to retain and receive diftinct Jtfea's: But whether It be then, or no, tl;is is certain, it does fo, long before it has the ufe of Words; or comes to that, which we commonly call the uji: of ReajDH. For a Child knows as certainly, before it can fpeak,the difference bet\\'cen the Idea's of Sweet and Bitter (i. e. That Sweet is not Bitter) as tt knows afterwards (when it comes tofpeak) That Worm-wood and Sugarplumbs, are not the fame thing. Chap. II. No innate Principles in ~he Mind. ~. t 6.AChild knows not thatThree andF our are equal toSeve~,til1 he comes to be able to count to Seven,and has got the Name and Idea of Equality:aml then upon the explaining thofe IV ?rds,he prcfent!y aifents to, or rather percetves the Truth of that Propolitwn. But netther does he then readily afo fent, becaufe it is an innate Truth, nor was his Aifent wanting, till then, becaufe he wanted the Vje of Reafon ; but the Truth of it appears to him as foon as he has feth;d in his Mind the clear anddiftinct ld:a's, that thef~ Names ftand for: And then, he knows the Truth of that Propolition, upon the f.1me Grounds, and by the fame means that he knew before That a Rod and Cherry are not the fame thing ; and upon the fam~ Grounds a!fo, that he may come to know afterwards, Tbat it is impojTible for tbe fome tl.>ing to be, ant! not to be, as we !hall more fully fl1ew here• after. So that the later it is before any one comes to havethofe generalltfea's, about wluch thofe Maxtms are; or to know the Signification of thofe general Terms that ftand for them ; or to puc together in his Mind, the idea's they ftand for; the later alfowill it be before he comes to aflcnt to thofe Maxims, whofeTerms, with the idea's they !land for, being no more innate than tlwfe of a Cat or a Weefel, he muft ftay t ill Ttme and Obfervation have acquainted him with them ; and then ke will be in a Capacity, to know the Truth of thefe Maxims, upon the firft Occalion, that fhall make him put together thofe Idea's in his Mind, and obferve whether they agree or difagree, according as is expreifed in thofe Propolitions. And therefore it is, That a Man lmows that Eighteen and Ninececn,areagoal to Thirty Seven by the fame felf-Evidence,that he knows One and Two to be equal to Three: Yet, a Child knows that, not fo foon as the other; not for want of the ufe of Reafon; but beeaufe the !.lea's the Words Eighteen, Nineteen; and Thirty feven ftarid for, are not fo foon got, as thofe, which are lignify'd by One, Two, and Three. §.I 7· ThisEvalion therefore of general A !Tent, when Men come tothenfe of Reafon, f.1iling as it does, and leaving no difference between thofe ft•(>J pofed-innatc,and otherTruths,that are afterwards acquired and learnt,Men have endeavoured to fecure an urtiverfal Affent to thofe they call Maxims, by fayigg, they are generally af[enterl to, as foon as propofed, and the Terms they are propo5d in, underfl:ood: Seeing all Men, even Children, as foon as they hear and underftand the Terms, aifent to thefe l'ropolitions, they think it is fufficient to prove them innate. For Iince Men never f.1il,aftcr they have once underftood the Words, to acknowledrrc them lor undoubted Truths, they would inferr, That certainly thefe l'j'ropoli• tions were firft lodged in the Underftanding, which, without any teaching, the Mind, at very firft l'ropofal, immedi~tely clofes with, and aifents to, and after that never doubts again. · §. I 8. In Anfwer to this, I demand whether ready aj[e11t, given to a Propofltion Npon firfl hearing, and underftanding the Terms, be a certain mark of an innate Principle 1 If it be not, fuch a general aifent is in vain urged as a Proof of them : If it be faid, that it is a mark of innate, they muft then allow all fuch l'ropolitions to be innate, which are generally afli:ntcd to as foon as heard, whereby they will find themfelvesylent• fully ftored With mnate Pnnctples. for upon the fame ground (viz.) of Al!ent at firft hearing and underftanding the Terms, That Men would have thofeMaxims pafsfor innate,they mull alfo admit fevera!Propofitions about Numbers,to be innate,ThatOne and Tivo are etptal to lbrte,ihnt Two and llooare equal ro Four,and a multitude of other the like l'ropofltions in Numbers,that every Body affems to,ac firft hearing,and under/landing the Terms muft have a place amongft thefe innate Axioms. Nor is this the C Prerogative 9 |