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Show ~8 'fhe Original of our Ideas. Book II. foning, Kno.,ing, Willing, and all the different actings of our own Minds_; which we being confcious of, and obfe:vmg 10 our (elves, do . from thde receive into our Underfl:andmg, as d1f1:10ct Ideas, as we do from t\od•es affecting ourSenfes. 1'hi5 Source of Jd•as., every Man has ~· holJ)\ in himfelf: And though it be not Senfe, as ha vmg nothmg to do wuh enh. rtal Objects ; yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be call'd internal Senfe. But as I call the other Sen{at1on, fo I call rlus II £. F L E C 11 0 N the ideas it affords being fuch only, as the Mind gets by reflecting on it; own Operations within it felf. By REF L E C T 10 N then, in the following part of tlus D1fcour~e, I would be underllood to mean, that notice which the Mmd takes of 1ts own Operations, and the manner of them, by reafon whereof, tj1ere come to be Idlas ofthefe Ope· rations in theUnderfl:anding. Thefe tWo, I fay,viz. External, Material things, as the Objects of S ENS A 1 I 0 N; and the Operations of our own Minds within, as the Objects of R E F L E C 1 ff) N, are, to me,rhc only Originals, from whence all our Idea' r take their begi~nings. The term Operations here! I u(e 10 ~large fence, as comprehendmg_ not barely the Actions of the Mmd about 1ts ideas , but fome fort of Pallwns anfing fometimes from them, fuch as is the fatisfaction or uneafinefs arifing from any thought. / §. 5'· The Underllanding feems to :ne, not to have the leafi glimmering of any Ideas, which it doth not rece1ve from one of thefe two: lff.ernal Objdls furni/h the Mind JVith tl;e Ideas of Jenjille qualities, wh1ch are all thofe different perceptions they produced in us : And the Mind f•r· nifhes tbe Vnderflanding JVith Ideas of its oJVn Operations. Thefe, when we have taken a full furvey. of them, and their feveral. modes, and the Compofitions made out of them, we thall find to conta10 all our whole flock of Ideas ; and that we have nothing in our Minds, which did not come in, one ofrhefe two ways. Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and throughly fearch into his Underfranding, and then let him tell me, Whether all the originat!deas he has there, are any other than of the Objects of hisSenfes,or of the Operations of his Mind,confidered as Objects of )lis Rejleflion : and how great a mafs ofl\nowledge foever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a firict view,fee that he' has not an; Idea in his Mind, but what one of thofe two ba'Ve imprinted; though, perhaps, with infinite variety compounded and er.Jarged, by the Underfran· ding, as we /hall fee hereafter. 9. 6. He that attentively confiders the fl:ate of a Child, at his firfl: coming into the World, will have little reafon to think him fiorcd with plenty of Ideas, that are to be the matter-of his future Knowledge. 'Tis by degrees he comes to be furnifhed with them: And though the /dear of obvious and familiar qualities, imprint themfelves, before the Memo· ry begins to keep a Regifier of Time and Order, yet 'tis often fo late be· fore fome unufual qualities come in the way, that there are few Men that cannot recollect the beginning of their acquaintance with them : And if it were worth while, no doubt a Child might be fo ordered,asto have bur a very few, even of the ordinary Ideas , till he were grown up to a Man. Jlut being furr~unded with Bodies, that pcrpetu~lly and diverfly atle.:tus, var.ety of!dea s, whether care be taken about 11, or no, are imprinted on the Mmds ofCiuldren. Ligbt,ond Colourr,are bufie and at hand every· where, when the Eye 1s butopen;Sot<nds,and fome t~ng,ible~al!ties,fail not tofolhCJte rheJT proper Senfes,and force an entrance to the Mind; but yet, I thmk, tt wJII be granted eafily, That if a Child were kept in a place, where-he never faw any other but Black and White, till he were a Man, he Chap. I. The Original of our Idea.r. he would have no more ideas of Scarlet or Green, than he that from his Childhood never rafted an Oyller, or a Pine-Apple, has of tbofe parricu· Jar Relithes. §.7. Men then come to be furnilhed,with fewer or morefimple Ideas from withour,according as the06jeE/s,they converfewithafford greater or leffet variety; and from the Operation of their Minds within,according as they more or lcfs rejlefl on them, For, though he that contemplates the Operations of his Mind, cannot but have plain alid clear Ide.s of them ; yet unlefs he turn his Thoughts that way, and confiders them attentivl" ly, he will no more have clear and difiinct Ideas of all the Operations of his Mind, and all that may be obferved therein, than he will have all the particular Ideas of any Landfcape, or of the Parts and Motions of a Clock, who will not turn his Eyes to it, and with attention heed all the Parts of it. The Picture, or Clock may be fo placed, that they may come in his way every Day ; but yet he will have but a confufed Idea of all the Parts they are made up of, till he applies himj'elf 11itb artention, to confider them each in particular, §. 8. And hence we fee the Reafon, why 'tis pretty late before mofi Children get Ideas o'f the Operations of their own Minds; and fome have not any very clear, or perfect ideas of the greatefi part of them all thCir Lives. Becaufe,though they pafs therecoatinually; yet like lloatingVifi· ons, they make not deep Impreffions enough, to leave in the Mind clear and difiinct, lafring Ideas, till the Underfianding turn inwards dpon its fclf, and rejlefl on its own Operations, and make them the Object of its own Contemplation. Whereas Children at their firfi coming into the World, feek particularly after nothing, but what may eafe their ffuoger or other Pain : hut take all other Objects as they come, are generalJy pleafed with all new ones, that are not painful; and fo growing up in a confiant attention to outward Senfations, feldom make any conliderable Reflection on what paifes within them, till they come to be of riper Years; and fome fcarce ever at alL . §. 9· To ask, at JVbat time a Man has prf1 any Tdeas, is to ask, when he begins to perceive, having Ideas and Perception being the fame thing. I know it is an Opinion, that the Soul always thinks, and that it has the actual Perception of Ideas in its felf confl:antly, as long as it exifis; and that actual thinking is as infeparahle from the Soul, as actual ExterHiort is from the Body ; which if rrue,to enquire after the begirtning of a Man's Idea's, is the fame, as to enquire after the beginning of his Soul. For by this Account, Soul and Ide at, as Body and Extenlion, will begin to exift both at the fame time. ~. xo. But whether the Soul be fuppofed to exifi antecedent to, or coeval with, or fome time after the firfi Rudiments of Organifatioo, or the beginnings of Life in the Body, I leave to be difputed by thofe, who have better thpught of that matter. I confefs rrly felf, to have one of thofe dull Souls, that doth not perceive it felfalways to contemplate its Ideas, nor can conceive it any more necelfary for the.Soul always to think, than for the Body always to move: the perception of Idea's, being (as I conceive) to the Soul, what motion is to the Body, not its Elfence, but Operation : And therefore, though thinking be fuppofed never fo much the proper Action of the Soul ; yet it is not ccceiTary, to fuppofe, that it ll1ould be always thinking, always in Action. That, perhaps, is the Pri· vLlege uf the infinite Author and Pre(erver of all things, wbo ne-vu /lum· 6ers nor J/eeps; but is not competent to any finite Being, at leafi not to the Soul of Man. We know certainly by Experience, that we fometime.<i think, 3? |