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Show Vniverjal Propojitionr, · Book IV. 9. rr. Be/ides Truth taken in the ilriCl: fenfe before-mentioned, there are other forts of Truths ; as, r. Moral irutb, which is (peaking Things according to the perfuafion of our own Mind>, though the Propolition we [peak agree not to the reality of Things. 2. Metapi~Y}icat iruth, which is nothing but the real Exiilence of Things, conformable to the Ideas to which we have annexed their Names. This, though it feems to ·con fill in the very Beings of Things, yet when conlidered a little nearly, will appear to include a tacit Propolition, whereby the Mind joins that particular Thing, to the Idea it had before fet!ecl with a name to it. But thcfe Conlidera(ions of Truth, either having been before taken notice o( or not being much to our prefent purpofe, it may fuffice here only to l;a1·e mentioned them. CHAP. VL Oj Uniwrfal Propo(ltions, their Trutl> and (ertaimy, §. ·r. THou~h the examining and judging of Ideas by thcmfelves, their Names bemg quite la1d a fide, be the bell_ and fureil way to clear and diilmCl: Koowl~dg~: _yet through the prevailing cullom of uling Sounds for Ideas, I thmk It Is very feldom praCl:ifed ; and every one may ol:iferve hoi" co.mmon it is for Names to be made ufe of inilead of t/Je Ideas themfelv>s, even when Men think and reafon withi~ their own Iirea{ls 1 efpecially if the Ide.s _be very complex, and made up of a great ColleCl:I~n of lim pie ones. ):'his makes t/;e coNjideration of Words and Propoftrons, Co nect_far~ .a p~rt of the ireatife of Knowldge, that 'tis very bard ·to fpeak Il)l'elligib!y,Qf the one, Without explaining the other. ~- 2 . .;'-II th~ Knowl~ge we have, being only of particular or genaat iruths, tiS eVIdent, that whatever may be done m the former of thefe the hitter, which is that which with Reafon- is moil fought after can neve; l>ewell~ade )mown, and is. very fe!dom apprehend<d, but a; conceived an~ exprejfed 111 Words. lt IS not t~erefore out of 04r way, in theExaminat, on of ourl{nowledge, to enqurremto the Truth and CErtainty of univerfal Propofit1ons, §. 3· But that we may not be mif-led in this cafe, by that which is the danger every-where, I mean by the doubtfulnefs of Terms, 'tis fit to obferve, that Certamty IS twofold;_ CertaintJ of (ruth, and Certainty of KnoJVlcdt/· Certamty of Truth Is, when Words are fo put together in Propofitio\)s, as exactly to ex~re_fs the agreement or difagreemem of the Id~as t)ley fland for, as really 1~1s: Certamty of Knowledge, is to perCeive tl1<: agreement O( d1fagreement of Ide~s, os exprelfed in any PropofitiOn. -r:lus we ufually call knowmg, or bemg certain of the Truth of any Propoliqon. , §.:4. Now becal<(~ we cannot be certain of the iruth of any genaal Propo/ itron, ••lefs we .<now,tbe precife bounds and extent of the Sp<cies its iamsjland for, I~ IS necelfary we lhou!d know the Eifence of each Species, which IS that_ Wh\cl\ conflitutcs and bounds it. This, in all fimpie Ideas and Modes, J,S not Jr.r,d_ to do : f0! .in thefe, the real and nominal Elfence beiq~thF fq(fle; or, wh1c.h IS all one,, the abilraCl: I.-lea, the general Term ilan s for,~emg th~ foleElienc,e and boundary,that is or can be fuppofed, of the Sp~cies, there can be no· doubt how far the Species extends, or what Thmgs are comprehended under each Term; which, 'tis evident, -,' are Chap. VI. their 'Truth and Certainty; 293 --------~-- ----------------~-- arc all that have an exact conformity with the Idea it !lands for, and no other. But in Subltances, where a real Effcnce, diflinct from the nomi' nal is fuppofed to conltitute, determine, and bound the Species, there the ext~nt of the general Word is very uncertain: becautc not knowing this, real EITencc:, we cannot ]mow what is, Or is not Of that Species, and ~on'fequenrly what may, or may not with certainty be allirmcd of it. And thus fpeaking of a Man, or Gold, or any other SpeCies of natural Sub{ lances as fuppofed made by Nature, and Jnrtaking of that real Eifence, which is fuppofed to conltitute that Specie;, we cannot be certain of the truth of an.y J).ffirmation or Negation made of it. For Man, or Gold, t<iken in this fenfe, Qnd ufcd for Species of Things; conltituted by real Effences different from the complex Idea in the Mind of the Speaker, iland for w~ know not what ; and the extent of thefe Species, with fuch Boundaries are fo unknown and undetermined, that it is impoiTiblc, with any certai~ty, to affirm, that all Men arc rational, or that all Gold is yellow. But where the nominal Effcnce is kept to, as the boundary of each Species, and Men extend the Application of any general Term no farther than to the particular Things,m wh1ch thecompl~x Idta rt flands for,Is_ to be found,there they are in no danger to miltake the bounds of eact•Spec1es~ or be in doubt on this account, whether any Propolitwn be true, or no. 1 have cho(e t~ explain this uncertainty of Propolitions in this fcholailick way, and have made ufe of the Terms ?f Ejfences ~nd 'specr~s, on purpofe to fi1ew the abfurdity and iiiconverl!ence there IS to tlunk. o'f them as of any other fort of Reahues, than barely abflraCl: Ideas With Nam~ to them. To fuppofe, that the Species of Things are any thing bu~ the forting of them under general Names, according :i~ theJ: agree t? feveral abltract Ideas, of which we make thofe Names the Stgns,Is to con~ found Truth and introduce Uncertainty into all general Propolinons,that can be made' about them. Though therefore thefe Things might'· t? People not poffelfed with fcholaflicic Learning, be perhaps treated ?'• '!!a better and clearer way; yetthofe wrong Notions ofEifences and Species, having got root in moll Peoples Mi_nds,_ wh~ have recetved any nnllure from the Learning, which has prevailed m thts part of the World,areto be dticov ered und removed, to make way for that ufe of Words,Wl]ICh lhould COMey certainty with it. ' ~- ;. The Names of SNb./lances then, whene-ver made to ./l•ndfor Species! JJhich ar<juppofed to 6e con/lituted /Jy re~l Ejfences, which we know not, 1re not capable to co•-vq Certainty to the Vnderjlandmg: Of the Truth of general Propolitions made up of fuch Terms, we cannot be fure. ~- 6. On the other fide, the Names of Subj/ances, when made ufe of, as they lhould be, for the Ideas Men have in their Minds, though they carry 1 clear and determinate lignification with them, wiU not yetferve tl4 to ••l:e many u•i,erfal Propoftions, of tvhofe ./ruth we c~n be certam_. Not becaufe in this ufe of them we are uncer.rain what Thmgs, are lignifi~d bY, them but becaufe the complex Ideas they fland for, are fuch Combi!'ations 'or limple ones, as carry not with them any difcoverable connex10n or repugnancy, but with a very few other Ideas. · § 7- The complex Ideas, that our Names pfSubflances prop~rly ilan~ for, are Collections of fuch Quaht1es, as Ipvebeen obferved to ~o-ex1~,! but what other ~alities necelfarily co-ex1fl With fuch CombwatiOns, " caon'ot certainly !mow, unlefs we can difcover their natura! dependence;, Which in their primary ~aliti~s, we can go but a very httl~ w~y ')l and 111. all their fecuadary Qyaliues, we ca? dlfcover no connexwn at\·~ for the Reafons mentioned, Chap. 3· vr~ r. Becaufe we kliow not t rea 1 |