OCR Text |
Show General'] erms. Book in .. which are to be found in it. Which Confiitution we know hot ; and fo having no particular Idea of, have no Name that is the Sign of it. But yet it is its Colour, Weight, Fufibility, and Fixednefs, f!fc. which makes it to be Gold, or gives it a right to that Name, which is therefore its nominal Eifence. Since nothing can be call'd Gold, but what has a Conformity of Q,lalities to that abfiract complex Idea, to which that Name is annexed. But this Diflinction of Effences, belonging particularly to Subfiances, we 0Jall, when we come to confider their Names, have an oc' cafoon to treat of more fully. 9. 19. That fuchabPrallJdeas, 1vith Names to ibem, as we have been fpeakiog of, are Effences, may !3rt her appear by what we are told con' cerning Elfeoces, 'Viz. that they are all iogcnerable, and incorruptible. Which cannot be true of the real Conflitution of Things, which begin and perifl1 with them. All Things, that cxifl in Nature, betides their Author, are all liable to Change; efpecia!ly thofe Things we are acquainted with, and have ranked into Bands, under diflinct Names or Enligns. Thus that,_ which was Grafs to Day, is to Morrow the Flefh of a Sheep; and wtthm few Days after, becomes part of a Man : In all which and the like Changes, 'tis evident, their real Eifence, that Conflitution' whereon th_e Properties of thefe feveral things depended, is defiroy'd, and periOJCs witl\them. But Effences bemg taken for Ideas, efiablifhed in the Mind, With Names annexed to them, the~ are fuppofed to remain fleadily the fame, whatever mutations the particular Subflances are liable to. For whatever becomes of Alexander and Bucepbalu.r, the Ideas to which Man and Horfe are annexed, arc fuppofed neverthelefs to remain the &me· and fo the Elfences ofthofe Species are preferved undeflroy'd, whateve; Changes happen to any, or all ?f the Individuals of thofe Species. By tlus means the Effence of a Spec1es refls fafe and entire without the ex ill· ence of fo much as one Individual of that kind. For ~vere there now no Circle exifliog any where in the World, (as, perhaps, that Figure exill1 not any where exactly marked out,) yet the Idea annexed to that Name would not ceafe to be what it is; and .to be as a pattern, to determine whtch of the particular Ftgureswe meet with, have, or have not a Right to the NameCtrcle, . and fo by havmg that Elfence, were of th•t Species. And though thercnetther were, nor had been in Nature fuch a Beafl as an Unicorn, nor fuch a Fi01 as a Mermaid ; yet fuppoling thofe Names to fiand for complexabflract Ideas, that contained no inconliflency in them· the Effence of a Mermaid is as intelligible, as that of a Man; and th; Idea of an Umcorn,as cert~m, fi":'dy, arid permanent, as that of an Horfe. ~rom what has been fatd, lt IS evtdent, that the ooarine of the Immutabi· hty of Effences, proves them to be only abflract Ideas ; and is founded on the Relauon, efiabh01ed between them, and c<rtaic Sounds as Signs of them; a~d wtll always be true, as long as the fame Name can have the fame ligmficatton. ~- ~o. To conclude, this is that, which in fl1ort I would f.,y, ( 'lJh.) that all the great Bufinefs of Genera and Species, and their Effences, amoums ~o no !"lore but thts, That Men making abfiract Ideas, and fettling them r,n1 thetr Mmds, Wtth Names annexed to them, do thereby enable them· ~ vc• (,0 con~derThmgs, and difcourfc of them, as it were in bundles, for t e ea ter ~n readler lmprovement, and communication of their Knowledge, whteh would advance but !lowly, were their Words and Thoughts confined 0nly to Particulars. CHAP. Ncunes of Jimpfe Ideas. 19 7 ----------- -----------~~ Chap. IV. t 1-l A P. IV. Oft he Names of Simple Ideas. §.!.THough all Words, :is! h:ivc fl1ewed, .lignifie nothing immedi- . ately, but the Irleas 10 the Mmd of the Speaker; yet upon a nearer furvey, we fhaU find that the Names of ftmple Ideas, mixed Modes; (under whtch l compnfc Rclauo~JS too,) and natural Subj/ances, /;ave ei>Ch of tbemfomctbm.~ pec~l!ar, and dtfferent from the others. For Example: ~- ~- Ftrfl, The 1\a'l'es ofjimple Ideas ant! Sub/lances , with the abl llraCl: Ideas m the Mmd, wh1ch they immediately fignilie, intimate alfo jome real Exij/ence, from wh1ch was denvcd their original pahern. But the Names of mixed Modes, termiwate in the Idea that is in the Mind and lead n?t the Thoughts any farther, as we !hall fee more at large id the followmg Chapter. , ~-1· Seconrlfr, The Names of jimple Ideas anp Modes, fr{i_"ifre alwajs the rtal, as well as >rom mal Ej{ence of their Species. But theN>mes of natural SuN/ances, jit,nijie rarely, if ever, an~ thing but barely the nominal Ef!en· m of thofc Spec1es, as we fl1all fl1ew 10 the Chapter, that treats of the Names of Subfiances m particular. ' ., ~- 4· 7hirdly, The Names of jimple Ideas are not capable of any deji. ., lion; the Names of all complex Ideas are. It has not, that 1:1mow,hith;:2 to been taken notiCe ofpy any Body, what. Words are, and what are not capable of bcmgdefined: the want whereof 1s(as I am apt tQthink)not feldom the occalion ot great wrangling;, and obfcurity in' Men's Difcourfes whilfl fome demand definitions ol. Terms, that cannot lie defined; and others tlunk, they ought ~o ref\ f~usfied, m. an Explicati·on made by a more general Word, and Its Reflna1on, (or to fpeak in Terms of Art by a Genus and Difference,) when even after that regular 'Definition ihofe who hear it, have often no more a clear Conception of the meaning of the Word, than they had before. Thisat leafl, I think, that the fl1e\ving what)¥ordsarc, apd what are not capable of Definibons, 'and wher6n confifls a good Definition, is n~t wholly ~elides our prefent purpofe; anll perhaps, wtll afford fo much Ltght to the Narure of thefe Signs, and our' Ideas, as to defcrve a more particular Confideration. §. 5· I will not here trouble my felf, to 'prove that all Terms are'no? definable from that Progrefs, in inftnitnm, which it will vilibly lead ;tid JOt<>, if we 010uld allow, that all Names could be defined. For il' ·rhe. Terms of one Definition, were !\ill to be delined by another, Where at" !aft fhould we fiop ? But I !hall from the Nature of our Ideas, and tile' Signification of our Words fl1ew, why fome Names can, andJ, others cdnnot' ~' rlefinet!, and which they arc. · , 1 ~- 6. I think, it is agreed, that a Definition is nothidg elfe, bat ·thJ /hewmg the me~ni»!f, of one. Word hy feveral otber. not Jjn~n)''}ONI, i'ermi.i Themean10g ot Words, bemg only the Idea they are maoe to frand ' !'br by h1m that ufes them ; the meaning of any Term is then fHeived', or' the Word is defined, when by other Words,the Mea it is amlexed Ia· and made the Sign of, in the Mind of the Speaker, is as it were reprefe~red, or fet before the view of another; arid thus its Signific\tiion afcertained; Tins IS the only ufe :tnd end of Definitions\ and therefdre the dnly mea-fltre of what is, or is not a good Definition. d •· ' · §. 7· This being p'remifcd, I fay, that tbe Names Ojjimpl• Jdeas, and ' thofe only, are incapable of being dejined. The Re:ifo'rl wlrcrl'ofis this; That' the feveral Terms of a D~fini tion, lignifying feveral !tf{in, ''fhey can·alro!· gether by ncr mezns repref'cnt an Mea, which hath ncr, 6::ohlpofitiorr it' · alt~ |