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Show 290 Trutb in general. Book IV. --~----------------------------=--------------------------- common Words of their Language, yet perhaps never troubled themfclves in all their Lives, to .confider what precife Ideas the moll: of them flood for: Some confufed or obfcure Notions have fcrved their turns; and many who talk very much of Religion and Confcien~e, of Church and Faith, of Power and Right, of Obfiructions and Humours, Melancholy and Choler, would, perhaps, have little left in their Thoughts and Meditations, if one ihould delire them to think only of the Things themfelves, and Jay by thofe Words, with which they fo often confound otljers, and not feldom themfelves alfo. §. 5. But to return to the confideration of Truth. We mufl:, I fay, otfervc two forts of Propolitions, that we are capable of making. Fir./1, Me11tal, n·!;erein the Ideas in our Underll:andings are without the ufe of Words put together, or Jeparated by the Mind, perceiving, or judging of their Agreement, or Difagreement. Secondly, Ver641 Fropofrtions, which are Words the ligns of our Ideas put together or .fep'arated in ajjirmative or negative Sentences. By which \vay ofyffirming or denying, thefe Signs, made by Sounds, are as it were, put together or fepamted one from another. So that·Prorolition conliil:s in joining, or feparating Signs; and Truth conlill:s in the · putting roðer, or feparating thefe Signs, according as the Things they ll:and for agree or difagree. 9.6. Every one's Experience will fatisfie him, that the Mind, either by perce1vmg or f~ppoling .the_ Agreement or Difagreement of any of irs Ideas, does tacn!y Wlthm It felf put them into a kind of Propolition affirmative. or negative, which I have endeavoured to exprefs by the termsPuttmgt?getherandSe~arating. But this Action of the Mind, wh1ch 1s fo fam11iar to every tlunkmg and reafonmg Man, is ealier to le conce1ved by re/lectmg on wh;lt palfes in us, when we reafonjudge,or fuppofe, than to be explamed by Words. When a Man has in his Mind the Idea of nvo Lines, vh. the Side and Diagonal of a Square, whereof the Diagd! lahs an ln~h long, he may have the Idea alfo of the divifionofthat Line, mro a certam number of equal parts ; v. g. into Five, Ten, an Hundred, a .Thoufand, or any other Number, and may have the Idea of that JnchLme, bemg d!v1fible or not div..ilible, into fuch equal parts, as a certain nu_mber of ~he111 Will be equal to the Side-line. Now whenever he perceives, believes, or fuppofes. fuch a kind of Divilibility to agree or difagree to lus Idea of that Lme, he, as 1t were, joins or fepurares thofe two. Ideas, vrz. the Idea of that Line, and the Idea of that kind of DiVIIiblilty, and fo makes a mental Propolition, which is true or falfe, accordwg as fuch a kind of DiviGbility , a Divilibi!ity into f•ch aliquot parts, does really agree to that Line, or no: And when Ideas are fo put together, or feparated in. the Min<!, as they or the Things they fiand for do agree, or not? that 1s, as I may call it, mental Truth. l!ut Truth of Words IS fomethmg more, and that is the affirming or denying of Words one of •')other , as th~ Ideas they il:and for agree or difagree : ~~~~he" kgam IS IS twofold, enher f•rely Ver6al, and trifling, which I J P a of, Chap. ro. or Real and mll:ructive · which is the Object of t Jat real Knowledge, which we have fpoken of ;!ready 1 ~·~-:u~ here again will be apt to occurr the fame d~ubr about Truth, t Jat ' a outKn?Wiedge : And it will be objected, That if Truth be not~ mgJ'utdr~e JOmmg or feparatingofWords in Propolitions asthe!deas ~ ey an or agree or difagree in Men's Mind the Knowledge of 1rutb ;.•ot fMva/uable a ihmg, as it is taken to be'· nor worth the Pains and lrne en lmploy m the fearch of it: lincery thiS occount,it amounts \O no more Chap. V. Trutb in general. more than rhe conformity of Words, to the Chim£ras of Men's Brai~~ Who knows not what odd Notions many Men's Heads are fill'd witll. and what firange !rleas all Men's Brains are capable of~ But if we fefr here, we lmow ~he Truth of nothing by this Rule, but of the vifiof1ary World in our own Imaginations ; nor have other Truth, but what as much concerns Harpies and Cenrours, as Men and Horfes . . For thofe; and the like, may be Ideas in our Heads, and have their agreement and difagreement there, as well as the Ideas of real Beings, and fo have as true Propolition5 made about them. And 'twill be altogether as true a Propolition, to fay all Centaurs are Animals, as that all Men are Animals;' and the ~errainry of one, as great as the other . . Form both the Propotitions, the Words are put together according to the agreement of the Ideas in our Minds' : And the agreement of the Idea of Animal, with that of Centaur, is as clear and vilible to the Mind, as the agreement of the Idea of Animal, with that of Man; and fo thefe two Propolitions are equally true, equally certain, But of what ufe is all fuch TrutH to us? . §. 8. Though what has been faid in the fore-going Chapter, to difl:inguifh real from im_aginary Knowledge, might fuffice here,. in anfwer to this Doubt, to d1fl:mglllfh real Truth from ch1mencal, or (1f you pleafe,) Weiy nominal, they depending both on the fame foundation;. yet it may not be amifs here again to confider, that though our Words lignilie no! thing but our Ideas, yet being deftgned by them to lignifie Things, the Trolh they contain, when put into Propolitions, will be only Ver/;af, when they fiand for ideas in the Mind, that have not an agreement With the reality of Things. And therefore Truth, as well as Kno~ledge, may well come under the diil:inct10n of Verbal and Real; that bemgonly verbal Truth wherein Terms arc joined, according to the agreement or difagreernent of the Ideas they ftand for, without regarding whether our Ideas are fuch as really have, or are capable of having an Exil:ence in Nature_ But then it is they contain realirutb, when thefe ligns are joined as our fdtas agree, and when our Ideas are fuch,as we know are cap~blc of having an Exill:ence in Nature; which in Subfl:ances we cannot know, but by knowing that fuch have ex1il:ed. . §. 9· Trutb is rhe markin_g down in Words, the agreement or dlfagreernent <>f Ideas as it' is. Faljboodis the marking down in Words,tlte agreement ar difagreement of Ideas otherwife than it is. And fo far as thefe /Jeas, thus marked by Sounds, agree to their Archetypes, fo fa~ only is lhe Truth real. The kr)owledge of this Truth, contiil:s ut knowmg whar /Jeas the Words fl:and for, and the perception of the agreement or dif. agreement of thofe Ideas, according as it is marked by thefe ~ords. 9. to. But becaufe Words are looked on as the gr""t Conduits of Truth and Knowledge, and that in conveying and receiving of Truth, and comlllonly in reafoning about it, we make ufe of Words and Propotit1ons, .I IIlaH more at large enquire; wherein the cert~mty ~f-real Truths, contained in Propolitions; conliil:s, and wher~ 1t IS t<> be had; and en~eavour to fhew iri what fort of univerfal Propofit10ns we are capable of being cer-tain of their real Tru'tli, or FaJfh·ood. . I !hall begin with general Propofitions, ~· tltoJe which moil: emploA orlr Thoughts, and exercife our ContemphitlOri. General TrutiiSare mo looked after by the Mind, as thofe that mofl: enlarge onr. Kno1V.ledge; and by tbeit comprehenlivenefs, fatisfying us at once of many pam.ulars, enlarge our view 1 arid fh'orten our way to Hinowledgi:. |