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Show .. Maxims. Book IV. acquainted with, nor fuch as its earlie{t 1\nowleJge is converfant ·~~~~Smndly,From whot has been faid,it plainly follows,tbat thefe magnified Maxims, are not tbe Principles a11d Foundatr~HS of all Oltr otber ~~~,ow: ld.ge.For if there be a ~reat many otherTruths, wluch have as much fe lt·ev1• dence as they, and a great many that we know before them, it is impofii. • ble they fhould be the Principles, from wh•ch we deduce all other Truth9. Js it impollibleto know that OM and llvo are equ~l to Tbree, but l>y Vlr• rue of this or lome f~ch AxiOm,"'"· the Whole IS equal to all lts Pam taken tog;ther? Many a one knows that One and 7ivo are ~ual to 71"", without having heard, or thought on that,. or any other Ax10m,by wluch it might be proved ; and imows 1t as certamly as any oth._r Man lmows, that the Whole is equal to all its Parts, or any other Max1m, and all from the fame Rea fan of felf-<;vidcnce; the Equality of thofe IJeas, being as vifible and certain to him without that, or any other Ax10m, as with it, it needing no proof to make it perceived. Nor after the !\now ledge, That the Wbole is e1ual to all its Parts, does he know that one and two are e• qual to' three, better, or more certainly than he did before. For if there' be any odds in thofe Ideas, the Whole and Parts arc more obfcure, or at lea!l: more difficult to be fetled m the Mmd, than thofe of One, 7ivo, and Three. And· indeed, I think, I may ask thefe Men, who will needs have all !\now ledge befides thofe general principles t hemfclves, to depend on general, innate, and [elf-evident Principles, What Principle is requilite to prove, that .One and One_are 7ivp, that 7ivo and 7ivo·are Four, that Thrtc times Two are Six? wluch bemg known Without any proof, do evince, That either all 1\nowledgedoes not depend on ~ertain Prtec•gnita or general Maxims, called Principles; or elfc that thefe are Prin;t:>Jes: and if thefe are to be counted Principles, a great part of Numerauon will be fa. To wllich if we add all, the felf-evident Propofitions, may be made about all our di{tinct Ideas, Principles will be almofl infinite, at lea!l: innume· rable, which Men arrive to the Knowledge of, at different Ages; and a great many of thefe innate Principles, they never come to know all their Lives.But whether they come in view of the Mind,earlier or later,this is true of them, that they are all known by their native Evidence, are wholly in· dependent, receive no Light, nor are capable of any proof one from ano· ther; much lefs the more particular, from the more general ; or the more fimple, from the more comppunded : the more fintple, and lefs atflrafr, being the mo{t familiar, and the eafier and earlier apprehended. But whichever be the cleare{t Ideas,the Evidence and Certainty of all fuch Propofitions is in this, That a Man fees the fame Idea to be tbe fame ltffa, and infallibly perceives two different Ideas to be different ld<as.For when a Man has in his Underfianding, the Ideas of one and of. two, the Idea of Yellow and the idea of Blue, he cann'/(but certainly know, that the Idra pf One is the Idea of One, and not tile .Idea of Two ; and that the Idea of Yellow is the Idea of Yell ow, and not the Itlea of Blue. For a Man cannot confound the Id<as in his Mind, which he has di!l:infr: That would be to have them confufed and di{tinct at the fame time which is a contradiction: And to hnve none diflinct, is to have no ufe of our Faculties, tQ .bave no 1\nowledge at all. And therefore what Idra foevcr is afformed of it felf; or whatfoever two enrire diflinCl: Ideas are denied one of an01her, the Mind cannot but affent to fuch a Propofition, as infallibly true, as f90n as 1t under!l:ands the Terms, without Hefititation or need of l'rool,or ccgarding tbofemadcin more general Terms, and called Maxims. §. u. Chap. VII. Maxims. -':qo ~- rt. What !hall w~ then f:lr, Ate thefe teiteral Ma-"ill.i'of rid \ilo Yes, they are of great Vflw Dt{j,utes, U (fop th( Mouf/Js vj Wtanl!~ts; but not of much Ufe tq the difcollery bfll~known Truths, or to helli tnc Mind forwards, in its fcarch after [{now ledge. For whoaVer beg~il tb build his Knowledge on this general Propofit1pt\, What Is, is .:' or It' 4 Jlh_t pcjlible for the faint thing to 6e, and not to he; and from e\thbt ofth~ft as f~o\n a Principl~ of Science, deduced a Sy!l:~m of ufcful !{no\llle/Jge ~ Wrong Opinions, often involving Contradictions, one of thcfe Maxilns, liS a Touch-!l:one, ·may fen1e well to fhe!N whither they lead : llJt yet, however fit, to lay open the Abfurdity or Ml{take of a )\fan's Re:lf\lning or Opinioo, they are of very little Ufefor enlightning the Undernanding: And ft will not be found, that the Mind receives ml!ch help from then) in its Plogrcfs in !\now ledge l which would he neither le~, nor le{s certain, were thCli! two geHeral Propofitiorls 'never thought on.. 'Tis true, :IS I have faid, they fc,metimes ferve in Argumentation to !l:op rt Wrangler's Mouth, by fhcwirig the Abfurcfity ol his Opinion. But it is one thing, to fhew a Man that he Is itt an Error; and another, to put him i•l poffetnon of Truth: and I would fai.n know what Truths thefe Prot>Ofitions arc able to teach ; and by their Influ.ence make us know, wh•clt we did not know before, or could not know without them. Let us reafan from them, as well as we can, they are ortly abclilt iderttical Predi: cations, ancf irlfluence, if an)' at all, norte but fuch. Each particular Propofition concerning Identity or Divcrfity, is as clearly and certainly known in it felf, if attended to, as e1rher of thefe general ones: and there is nothing more certain, than that by thefc Maxims alone we cannot evi· dence to our felves the Truth of any one thing really exi!l:ing. As to other lefs general Maxims, many of them are no more than bare verbal Propofitions, ahd reach us nothing but the Refpect and Import of Names one to another. The Whole is eqr1al to all its Parts, What real Truth I be• feech you does it teach us? What more is contained in that Maxim, than what the Signification of the Word T•tum, or the Whole, does of 1t felf Import ! And he that knows that the' Word Whole, Jhnds for what ~s made up of all its Parts, knows very httle lefs, ~h~n that th~ W/;o/e 1s equal to all its Parts. And upon the fame ground,! dunk that th1s Propofition, A Hill is bigber than a Palley, and feveral. the like, may alfo p~fs for Maxims. But yet Mathematicians do not Without Reafon place tlus, and fame other fuch, among{{ their Maxims, that their Scholars, having ln the entrance perfcctl y acquainted their Thoughts with thefe Propofitions, made in fuch general Terms, may have them ready to apply to all particular Cafes: not that if they be equally weighed, they are more clear and evident tiJan the particular Inftances they arc brought to confi~m; but that being more familiar to the Mind, th~ very n~ming them 1s ehough to fatisfie the Under!l:anding, But th1s, I £1y, 1s m~rc from our Cunom of u1ing them,thao the different Ev1dcnce of the Tlungs. But beU> re Cu{tom has fetled Methods of Thinking and Reafonmg m our M mds, f am apt to imagine it is quite oth~rwife: and that theCiuld,whcn a part of his Apple is taken away, knows 1t better in that pamcular In fiance, than by that general Propofition, The Whole iJ equal to all its Parts; and that If one of thefe,have need to be confirmed to him by the other, the general has more need to be let intO his Mind by rhe particular, than ~he partlCU· Jar by the general. For ia particulars, our !\now ledge bepns, and fo fpreads it tclf; by degrees, to generals. . Though afterwaras,. ~1e. Mmd takes the quire contrary Courfe, and hav•~g dra,~n 1ts f{nowlcd~e mto as general Propofitions as it con, makes thofe fam1hur to 1ts Thoughts, and accufloms |