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Show Maxims. Book IV· ~very one that has any Knowledge ~t all, has, as the foundation of it, various apd difiind: Ideas: And 1t·1s the firfi ad: of the Mmd, (wtth• out which, it can never be capable of any Knowledge,) to know every one of its Ideas by it felf,and difiinguilh it from others. This i~ that which every one finds in himfelf,that the !de as he has he_ k~ows; he knowg alfo when any one is in Ius Underfiandmg, and what 1t JS : And when more than one are there, he knows them difiinctly and unconfufedly one from another: Which always being fo, (it being impoffible but that' he lhould perceive what he perceives,) he can never be in doubt when any Idea is in his Mind, that it is there, and is that Idea it is ; and that two difiind: ld<as, when they arc in his Mind, are there, and are not one and the fame Idea. So that all fuch Affirmations, and Negations, are made without any poffibility of doubt, uncertainty, or hefitation, and mufi necelfarily be alfented to, as foon as underfiood; that is, as foon as we have, in our Minds, the Ideas clear and difiind:, which the Terms in the Propofition fland for. It is not therefore alone to thefe two general Propolitions, Whatfotver is, is ; and, It is impojfiUe for the famt Thi•g, to he, a•d not to he, that this Self-evidence belongs by any peculiar right, The perception of being, or not being, belongs no more no thefe vague Ideas, lignified by the terms Whatfotver, and ihing, than it does to any other ldtas. The Mind, without the ljelp of any proof, perceives as clearly, and knows as certainly, that the Idea of Wbite, is the Idea of White, and not the Idea of Blue; and tl)~t the ldta of White, when it is in the Mind, is there, and is not abfcnt; and fo a irianr,le, Moti011, a /lfan or any other Ideas whatfoever. So that in refped: ol Identity, our inrui'!ive l{nmyledge reaches as far as our !d-.s: And fo we are capable !lf !'laking as mnnr, felf-evjdent Propoflti,on~, as we have names for . di· f\lnGt Ide at. A nil I arpeal tp ever ones own Mi~d, whether this Pro• pqfltion, A Circle is a Circ{;, be not as {elf-evident a Propofition, a~ that confifiing of more generaHer.ms, Wbatfoever iJ, is: . And again, ~vhethe~ this Propolition, 1,3/ue is not Rd, be not a Propofition that the Mincl can no more doubt of, as foon as it underftands the Words, tha~ it does of that Axiom, It is impoj1ihle for tbe Jam( t!Jing to be1 a11d 1101 to ~e 1 ~nd fo of all the like: · · §.5. &co~dlj, As to Co-e,<i/lence, or f4ch a ncceffitry connexion be· .tw~en two Ideal• that in the Subjed: \Vhhe one of them is fuppofcd, tljerc the other. mufi necelf'lfily be alfo ': Qf fuch agtecment, or difagrce7 1'JCnt as th1s, the Mmd has an tmmed~ate perception' but in very few of t)ltm. And therefore in . this fort, . vJe hav,e' bui vj,ry little i,fituitivo 1\n?wledge :. nor are t!J~rc'ro be found ~ery ma~y )'ropolirions that are feff-ev1dcol> though fomql)ere arc; v. 1;. the lde.r of filling qf a place equal to the"CQntenrs of itsfuperficies, be,fng annexed to our ldta of )3<ldy, l t!link it is a; felf.evidenfProi'Ofition 1 T/;at tw~ flo'dies ciznNot ~e i• tbe .[am_f place.. . .,~ ~) "1'1 1 ' I . . .) ; ~· 6. Th~rd?-, As to the Re!attons- of M9des1, M,athemattciW~ have fran\ed m~nx Ax1oms ~oncernmg l)Jat one Relation of E9valicy. As J;~qalshrak;n from Equals, tl1e rem~inq~r will be Equals ; which, with t!1e re .· ~f[h~t ktnd, l)owev~r they arefce<;iycd for Mnxims by r)te Ma· }heoJa!ICian!,and are ~~qu~fhqnable Trut]ls ; yet, I think, th~t any one Who confiders them, W1Jl not find, that they have a \')carer feJf.cvidence £Mn thefe, that one and O)lC, ore eqq:~J i,Q two ; tljat if)'Qu take from the five F mgers 9f one Hand \Wo, and trR{ll the fi~e )ijngers -of ~h< o~her l-lanJ twq, lh,!f rema1mp!\ number wil) be equal. ' ;(;l1~re and a thoutao4 other (uqj1f.fp~olition~,I1J?3 be found iH~umber;~r\4h·,~,at •·er.>; t;ffi herr: • ., · • J'~. nng, Chap. VII. Maxims. ring, force the alfen(, and carry with tljcm an equal, if not gteatot ¢learne(<, than thofe mathematical Axioms. §. 7· FoMrtbly, As tonal Exif/tnu, Iince that has no conncxion with any other of ow Ideas, but that of our felvcs, and of a firfr Being, we have in that,concerning the real exifience of all oth<r Beings, not fo much a~ de. rnonfirative, much lefs a (elf-evident Knowledge: And therefore concerning thofe there are no Maxims, §. 8. In the next place let us confider , wb.1t i•flue•u. thof' received Maxims have, upon the oth~r parts of our Kmwl,age. 1ilC Rules cf\ablilhed in the Schools, that all Reafonings arc expMco!,uitis, & prtfcmcef fis, fecm to Jay the foundation of all other Knowledge, in thefe Maxims, and to fuppo!~ them to be prll!cor,nita; whereby, T think, is meant thcfe two thin~<: Firfi, That thefe Axioms, are thofe Troths that arc fir!l known to the Mind; and, fer,ondly, That upon them, the other parts of our Knowledge depend. . ~. 9· Fir(/, That they are not the Truths jrf1 know• to the Mind, is evident to Experience. Who perceives not, that a Child certainly knows, that a StrangQr is not its Mother ; that its Sucking-bottle is not the Ro~, long before he knows, that 'tis impojTiUe for the fame thi•g to be,a11d not to h' And how many Truths are there aboutNumhcrs, which it is obvious to obferve that the Mind is pcrfe~r!y acquainted with, and ully convinced of,befo;c it ever thought on thefe general Maxims, to wltic)l. Mathema. ticians, in their Arguings, do . fomet1mes refer ~hem r Whereof the rC\1, fan is very plain: ~or that wluch makes th~ Mmd atfent to fuch l'ropolitions, being n_otlung elf a but the perce~t1on It has of the agreement, . or difagreement ot tts Ideas, }ccordmg as tt finds them allin~ed or dented one of anot~,in Words 'It und~rfiands; and every ldeabemg known to be what it is, and every two d1fimCl: Ideas not to be fame, It mull necclfarily follow, ,that fuchfel.f-evident.Truths, mufi befirfi known,' which eonfifi of Idtas that are firfr m the Mmd : and the Ideas firfi m the Mmd; ~i• evident, are thofe of particuliar Things, from whence, by ll~w de~ n!es, the Underfianding proceeds w fame fe.w general ones; whtch b~· ing taken from the ordmary and famthar ObJects of S enfe, are fetled 10 the Mind, with general Names to them. Thus parttcular Ideas are firft received and difiineuilhcd, and fo Knowledge got about them: and next to them, the lefs ge~eral, or fpecifick, which are next to particular. For sbll:raet ld-.s are not fo obvious or ealie to Cluldren, or the yet uncxer· cik!d Mind, as particular ones. If they feem fo to grown Men, 'tis only lx;caufe by con!lant and familiar ufe they <~re made fo: For when wa i' ·1y refleCl: upon them, we flJall find, that general (deas arc FICl:1ons ConrriV<Inces of the Mmd, thac carry dtfficulty With ll1~m, and do (0 eaf1Jy ol!'er themfelves! as w'e<~re opt to imagine. For example, it not nquire (orne pams and skill oo form the gene<al idea of n ngle, {\fhieh is yet none of the mofi ab(had:, comprchenfive, ~nd cult,) for it mufi be neither Oblique, nor Reaangle, netther Equilateral, E:quicrur.l, nor Scalenon ; but all and n?ne ol thefe at once. In tfletl:, it is lbmething imperfect? that cannot ex1fr; an Idea wherem f?"!e parts of feveml different and mconlifient ideas are put together. Tis ti'i!e, the Mind in this imperfeCt flare, has need offuch Ideas~ aod makes Ill the hafie't0 them it <>19, for the convenimcy of Comrnumcauon, and .l!nlargemeM of Kno10•led\ie; w both which, it is naturally very much tadined. But yet one !las 'reafon to fufped: fuch ftl,as are marks of our lmperiCCl:ion .• •t leaR this is enough to lhew, that the rnolt ablha:l: and rreneral ideas ar~ not thofe that the Mind is firf\ and molt ealily , ' , , ~cquam .. |