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Show 116 Po~er. Book II. tural Subfiances, (as we lhall fee hereafter,) and I mention them as fuch according ro common apprehenfion; yet they bemg not, perhaps, fo truly aCtive Powers, -as our hafiy Thoughts are apt to ~eprefent them, 1 judge it not amifs, by this intimation, to dtreCt our Mmds. to the confideration of G 0 D and Spirits, for the cleardl: Idea of aCttve Power: §. 3· I confefs Pow<r in~ludes in !t fome kind of rdat1on, (a relatiOn to ACtion or Change,) as mdeed whtch of our Ideas, ofwhatkmd foever, when attentively confidered, does not 1 For our Ideas of Extenfion, Duration, and Number, do they not all contain in them. a fecret relation of the Parts? Figure and Motion have fomething relattve m them much more vifibly · and fenfible Qpalities, as Colours and Smells,&c. what are they but theP~wersof different Bodies, in relation to our Perception, &c. And if confidered in the things themfelves, do they not depend on the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of the Parts~ "All which !nclude fome kind of relation in them. Our Idea therefore of Pow<r,I thmk, may well have a place among!l: other fimple Ideas, ~nd be confide~ed as one of them, being one of thofe that makes a pnnctple Ingredtent m our complex Ideas of Subfiances, as we lhall here after have occafion to lhew. §. 4. Ofpaffive Power, all fenfiblt things abundantly furnifh us with Ideas; whofe fenfible Qpalities and Beings we find to be in a continual flux, and therefore with reafon we look on them as liable fiill to the fame Change. Nor have we of aE/i-ue Power (which is the more proper lignification of the word Pow<r) fewer in!l:ances : Iince whatever Change is obferved, the Mind mull colleCt a Power fomewhere, able to make that Change,as well as a peffibility ir\the thing it felfto receive it. But yet if we will confider it attentively, Bodies by our Senfes do not afford us fo clear and dill:ind: an Idea of atl:ive Power, as we have from refleCtion on the Operations of our Minds. For all Power relating to ACtion, and there being but two forts of Atl:ion whereof we have any Idea, -viz. Thinking and Motion, let us confider whence we have the clearefl: Ideas of the Powers which produce thefe ACtions. r. Of Thinking, Body affords us no !tlta at all, it is only from RefleCtion that we have that; neither have we from Body any IdeA of the beginning of Motion. A Body at refi affords us no Idta of any atl:ive Power to move; and when it is fet in motion its felf, that Motion is rather a Paffion, than ~n ACtion in it: For when the Ball obeys the O:roke of a Billiard-fiick,it is not any aCtion of the Ball, but bare paffion; alfo when by impulfe it fets another Ball in motion that lay in its way, it only communicates the Motion it had received from another, and lofes in it felf {a much as the other received ; whiclr giv~ us but a very. obfcure ldea of an active Power of Moving in Body, ~~till: we obferve tt only to transferr, but not produce any motion. For tt ts but a very obfcure Idea of Power, whtch reaches not the ProduCtion of the ACtion, but the Continuation of the Paffion: For fo is Motion in a Body impelled by another; the continuation of the Alteration made in it from ReO: to Motion, being little more an Action, than the continuation of the Alteration of its Figure by the fame blow is an ACtion. The Idea of the beginning of Motion, we haveonlyfrom refleCtion on what palfes tn our felves, where w~ find by Expenence, that barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the Mmd,we can move the parts of ourBodie.<,which were before at ref!:: So that tt feems tome, we have from the obfervation of the o~eration of Bodies by our Senfes, but a very imperfeCt obfcure Idea of acttve Pow~r, fince they afford us not any Idea in themfelves of the Power to begrn any ACtion; Ctther Motion or Thought. But if from the lmpulfe Bodtes are obferved to make one upon another, any one thinks he has Chap. XIX. Po'fller. I 17 . --hasa clear Idea of Power, it ferves as well to my puipofe, &n/ation being ?"e of thofeways, whereby the Mmd comes by its Ideas; only 1 thought tt worth whtle to confider here by the way, whether the Mind doth not r~etve tts Idea of aEI1ve PoJVer clearer from refleCtion on its own Opera-tions, than tt doth from any external Senfation. ~. 5: This at lea!l: I think evident, That we find in our (elves a Power to begm or forbear, ~ontmue or end fcverai, Thoughts of our Minds,. and Mottons of our Bodtes, barely by the chmce or preference of our Minds. Thts Power yhe Mmd has to prefer the Conlideration of any Idea, to the ~Jot confidenng tt ;. or to prefer the Motion of any part of the Body, to tts Refi,ts. that, I dunk, we call the WI/ I; and the actual preferring one to ~nother, ts that we call Volztro•, or WiUing. The power of Perception iS that we call the. Vnderf1anding : Perception, which we make the act 9ft he Underflandmg, ts of three forts: x. The Perception of Ideas in our Mmds. 2 . The Percepuon of the lignification of Signs. 3· The Perce~ epttOn of the Agreement or D•fi<grecment of a~>y difiinc:t Ideas. All thefe are attributed to the Undcr!l:anding, or perceptive Power though it be to the two latter, that in firittnefs of Speech the atl: of u'ndoci\an-ding is ufually applied. ' §. 6. Thrfe fowersof the Mind, -vi:. of Perceiving, and of Preferring, are ufually call d by another name ; and the ordmary way of Speaking is, That the Underfiandmg and Wtll, are two Faculties of the Mind. a word proper en<;mgh, if it be ufed as all Wordslhould be, fo as not to breed"'.'~ confufion m Mens Thoughts,. by betng fuppofed (as I fufpett it has been) ~ofl:and for fomereal Bemgs m the Soul, that performed thofe ACtions of Underfl:anding and Volition. For when we fay the Will is the commanding and fuperiour Faculty of the Soul ; that it is,or is not (roe ·that it determines theinferiour Faculties; that it follows the DiCtates of ;he Underfianding, &c. though thefe and the like Expreffions, by thofe that carefully attend to .their own Ideas, and condutl: their Thoughts more by the evtdence ofThmgs, than the found of Words, may be underfl:ood in a clear and di!l:inct fenfe; yet I fufpect,l fay,that this wayof (peaking of Faculties, has miOed many into a confufed Notion of {o many di!l:inc:t Agents ·in us, which had their feveral Provinces and Authorities,and did command ,obey, and perform feveral Actions, as fo many difiinc:t Beings ; which ha; been no fmall occafion of wrangling, obfcurity, and uncertainty in Qpethons relatmg to them. . ~· 7· Every one, I think, finds in himfelf a power to begin or forbear, continue or put an end to feveral ACtions in himfelf. The power the Mind has at any time to prefer any particular one of thofe Aaions to its forbearance, or Vice -verfa, is that Faculty which, as I have faid, we call the WiB; the aCtual exercifc of that Power we call Volition; and the forbearance or performance of that Action, confequent to fuch a preference of the Mind, is call'd Voluntary. Mencc we have the Ideas of Li6ertyand Neujfity, which arife from theconfideration of the extent of this Power of the Mind over the ACtions, not only of the Mind, but the whole Agent, the whole Man. ~. 8. All the Actions that we have any Idea of reducingthcmfe~ves, as h"' been faid,to thcfe two, -viz. Thinl<ingandMotion, folarasa Man has a power to ~hink, or not to think; to move, or not to move, according to the preference ol his own choice, fo f.1r is a Man Free. Where-ever any pcrlormance or [(>rbearanceare not equally in a Man"s power; wherever doing or not doing, will not equally follow upon the preference of his Mmd, there he is nothee, though perhaps the ACtion may be voluntary. So |