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Show I:Z.O POJ'I!er. Book II. ~. 1 &. 'Tis plain then, That the Will is ~othing but one Power or . Ability, and Freedom another Power or Ab1hty: So that to ask, \\'~!ether the Will has freedom, is to ask, whet.her one Power has another 1 ower, one Ability another Ability ; a Qgefhon at firll fight too grofly abfurd ake a Difpute, or need an Anfwer. for who IS It that ices not, that. ;::rs belong only to Agents, and a~e .Attri~•W o~!y of Suhjlan:ts, and not of Powers themfelves? So that tlus way of pumng the quell10n, ''""· whether the Will be free, is in effect to ask, whether the W1ll be a Subfiance, an Agent, or at !call to fuppofe It, li.nce freedom. can properly be attributed to nothing clfe.Iffreedom can wtth any pro.Pnety of Speech be applied to Power, it may be attributed to the Po:-ver, IS m a Man, to produce, or forbear producing Motion in parts~~ h1s Body, b~ cho1ce or preference· whicll is that which denom1qates lum free, and IS freedom it fel( B;t if any one lhould ask, whether freedom were free, he would be fufpected not to underlland well what .he faid ; and he would ~ thought to defervc Midas's Ears, who knowmg that R1ch was a denomination from the po!Te!f10n of Riches, lhould demand whether R1ches themfelves were rich. ~. 17. However the name Faculty,. which. Men have gi~en to this Power call'd the Will, andfo talked of 1t as acbng, may by tlus appropnated term, feem a little to palliate the abfurd1ty, yet the Will m truth, lignifies nothing but a Power, or Ab1hty, to preferro_r ch<;>ofe_; and wh~n conlidered, as it is, barely as an Ab1hty to do fomethwg •. It Will eatily dlf· cover the abfurdity,in faying it is free! or not. free. for 1f 1t be reafonable to fuppofe and talk of faculties, asdillmtt ~emgs, t~at can act, (as we do, when we fuy the Will orders, and th~ W1ll1s free,) tiS fit that we fhould make a fpeakingFa~ultJ, and a walkmg ~nculty, and a dancmg Faculty, by which tbofe Atl:10ns arc produced, wluch are but feveral Modes of Motion. as well as we do the W11land Underllandmg to be faculties, by whicl1 the Actions ofChoofing and Perceiving are produced, which are but feveral ModesofThinking; and we may as properly fay, that 'tis the finging Faculty fings and the dancing Faculty donees, as that the Will choofes, or that the Underllanding conceives ; . or, as is ufual, that the Will diretts the Underllnnding, or th~ Underllandmg obeys, or obeys not the Will. It being altogether as proper and mtelhg1ble to fay, that the power of Speaking direCts the power of Singing, or the power of Singing obeyS or difobeys the power of Speaking. . 6. 18. This way of talking, neverthelefs, has preva1led, and, as I guels, produced great coofufion ; for thefe being all different Powers in. the Mind or in the Man, to do feveral At!: tOns, he exerts them as he thmks fit ; but the power to do one At!:ion, is not operated on by the power of doing another Action. for the power of Tlunkmg operates not on the power of Choofing ; nor the power of Choofing on the power of Thinking, no more than the power of Dancmg operates on the power of Smg· ing, or the power of Singing on the power of Dancing, as anyone may eafily perceive, who will but confider; and yet that is it which we fay, when we thus fpeak, that tbt Will iiperater on t!Jt Vwdtrftanding, or tht Vnderftandiwg 011 the Will. ~· '9· I grant, that this or that attual Thought, may be the occafion of Volition, or exercifing the power a Man has to choofe ; or the attual choice of the Mind, the caufe of attual thinking on this or that thing: As the aCtual tinging of fuch a Tune, may be thcoccafion of dancing fuch a pance,and the actual dancing offuch a Dance, the occalion of fingingfuch a Tune: But in all thefe, it ·is not·one power that operates on another; for Chap. XXI. , PoYPer. for Powers are Relations, not Agents: but it is the Mind, or the Man, !'bat operates, and exerts thcfe Powers; that does the Adion,he has power, or is able to do. Tbat wbic!J !Jar tbt power, or not the power til operiStej iJ tbat alone, wbich is, or iJ not free; and not the Power it fclf: for Freedom, or not Freedom, con belong to nothing, but what has, or has not a power to aCt. §.10. T he attributing ro Faculties,that which belonged not to them, hns given occafion to this way of talking: but the introducing into Dif.. .:ourfes concerning the Mind, with the name of Faculties, a Notion of their operating, has, I fuppofe, as little advanced our Knowledge in that JY.lrt of our felves;as the great ufe and mention of the like invention of Faculties, in the operations of the Body, has helped us in the knowledge of Phylick. Not that I deny there are Faculties both in the Body aod Mind : they both of them have their powers of Operating , elfe neither tfic one nor the other could operate : }'or nothing can operate, that is not able to operate; and that is not able to operate, that has no power to operat~. Nor do I deny, that thofe Words , and the like , are to have their place in the common ufe of Languages, that have made them curtani. It looki like too much affeCtation wholly to lay them by: and Philofophy it felf, though it likes nota gaudy drefs, yet when it appears in publick, mull have fo much Complacency, as to be cloathed in the ordinarv falhion and Language of the Country, fo far as it can confifi with Truth and Perfpicuity. But the fault has been, that faculties have been fpoken of, and reprefented, as fo many dillinct Ageltts: for it being asked, wha~ it was thatdigefiedthcMeat in our Stomachs? It was a ready,and very fatlsfattotyAnfwer, to fay, ThatitwasthedigefuveFaculry. What was it that made any thing come out of the Body ? The expultive faculty. What moved! The Motive faculty: And fo in the Mind thg intellettual Faculty, or the Underllanding, underll<iod; and the eleCtive Faculty, or the Will, willed or commanded: which is in lhort to fay, That the ability to dig ell, aigefted ; and the ability to mo~e, moved ; and the abi!ity to unded\~nd, underllood. for Faculty, Abil1ty, and Power, I thmk, are but d!ffe. rent names of the fame things: Which ways of fpeaking, when put mto more intelligible Words, will, I think, amount to thus much~ That D1· gellion is performed by fomething tha~ is able to digefi; Motion by Comething able to move ; and Underlland1rg by fometh1ng able to underlland. And in truth it would be very llrange if it lhould be orherwrfe; as llrange as it would be for a Man to be free without being able to be free. . 1 I. ~.~I. To return then to the Enquiry about Liberty, I thm < toe r2Jie· J1ion is not proper, wbet!Jer tbe Will 6e free, 6•t tvbetbtr a Mall 6t free. Thus, !think, . •fl. 1 , That fo far as any one can, by choice, or preference of the ex1nence of any ACtion, to the non-exillence of that Aetwn, and, vrce verfa, make ittoexill, or not exill; fo far he JSfree: ~or 1! I can,by theprefer;nceof the motion of my Finger to its refi, make It .move, or 'UJU .verflJ, tlS evident, that in refpett ot that, I am free : and 1f I can, by a hke thought o( my Mind, preferring one to the other, produce e1ther words, or lilence, I am at liberty to (peak, or hold my peace: .and ar far as tim Power rtdches, of aElin!l,, or •ot ad ill[,, by tbe d~termmatron of/mown l'bougbt prejerrrwg eitber J• far is a Man free. For how can we dunk any one freer than to ha;e the power to do what he will? And fo far as an}' one can (by preferring any Action to 1ts not be1ng; or Rell to any Achon) produce that Action or Rell fo far can he do, what he will : For fuch a prefernng. of ' R Actioo |