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Show --:z-.8S- ----~-Re-al~ity~ o~f ~Kn~ol~l!le-dg-e. --~B-oo-k- IV-. way of Re:~fooiog in this Matter, People do lay the whole firefs on the Figure, and refolve the whole Eilence of the Species of Mao, (as they make it,) into the oun\vard Shape, how unreafonable foever it be and how much foever they difdwn it, we need but trace their Thought; and PraGtice a little far.ther, and the~ it will plainly appear. The well-ihaped Changehng IS a Man, has a ranonal Soul~ though lt appear nor; this is pafl: doubt, fay you. Make the Ears a httle longer, and more pointed and the Nofe a little flatter than ordinary, and then you begin !O boggle; Make the Face. yet narrower, flatter, and longer, and then you begin to doubt : Add !\1ll more and more of the l1kenefs of a Brute to it , and let the Head be p~rfecUy that o~ fame. other Animal , then prefently 'tis a Monfl:er; and tiS demonfl:rauoo With you, that 1t hath no rational Soul and mufl: be defl:roy'd. Where now (I ask) lhall be the jufl: meafur' which the utlllOfl: bounds of that Shape, which carries with it a ratio:1i Scul 1 For Iince there has been humane Fa:tu/s produced, half lleafl:, and half Man ; and others three part one, and one part t' other : And fo it is poilible they may be in all the varlhy of approaches to one fhape or th~ other, and may hove feveral degrees of mixture of the likenefs of a Mao or a Brute. I would gladly know what are thofe precife Lineament.' which according to this Hypothelis, arc, or are not capable of a rationai Soul w be joined ro them ? What fort of ourlide is the certain ligo, that there IS, or IS not fuch an Inhabitant W1thm 1 For till that be done, we talk at random of Man; and flmll always, I fear, do fo, as long as we give our !elves up ro certam Sounds, and the Imaginations of fetled and fixed Species in Nature, we know n~t what. But after all, I delire it may be confidered, that th?fe who, thmk they l1ave anfwered the difficulty, by telhog us, that a m1f-ihaped Fa:tur IS a Monfier, run into the fame fault they are arguing agaiofl:, by confl:itutiog a Species between Man and Beall: for what elfe, I ~ray, is their Monfier in the cafe, (if the word Monfler ligmlie any tluog at all,) but fomething neither Mao nor Bcafl:, but partakmg fomewhat of c1th:r; and )ufl: fo is the Changeling be· fore mentioned. So neceiTary IS It to qu1t the common notion ot Spe· cies and ErTeoces, if we will truly l_ook into the Natu":iliJ>f Things, and examme them, by what our Faculties can difcover in ~m as they exifl and not bygroundlcfs Fancies have been taken up about them. ' §. r 7. I have mentiOned tillS here, becaufe I think we cannot be roo cautious, that Words and Species, in the ordinary Nqtions we have been ufed to of them, Impofenot on us: For I am apt to think therein lies one great obfl:acle to our clear and difiiod: Knowledge, ef}~cially in reference to Subfiances; and from thence has rofe a great part of the Dilliculties about Truth and Certainty. Would we accufiom our felves to feparate our Contempl.atioos and Reafonings from Words, we might, in a gr~at meafure,remedy thiS I~convem~nce within our own Thoughts; but yet It would filii difiurb us In our D1fcourfe with others, as long as we rctamed the Opm10n, that Spec1es and their EITences were any thing elfe but our abfl:raGt Ideas, (fuch as they are,) with Names annexed to them, to be the ligns of them. §.r8. Where.everwe perceive the Agreement or Difagreement of any of our Ideas 1 there is certain. Knowledge; and where-ever we are furo thofe Ideas agrecw1th the reahty of Things, there is certain real Knowledge. Of wluch Agreement of our Ideas with the reality of Thini;s, havmg here g1veo the marks, I tlunk I have !hewn wherein it js that Certainty, real Certainty, confifl:s; which whatever it was to others, was, I confer., to me heretofore, one of t!Jofe Dejidaata which I found great want of. CHAP. Chap. V. 'Truth in general. CHAP. V. OJ Tmtl> in general. §.1. vvHat is Truth, was an Enquiry many Ages Iince; and it being that which all Mankind either do, or .pretend to fearch after, it cannot but be worth our while carefully to examme wherein it confifts; and fo acquaint our fclvcs with the Nature of it, as to obferve how the Mind difl:ioguiihes it from Fallhood. §. 2. Truth then fcems to me, in the proper import of the Word, to figoifie nothing but tbe joining or feparating of Sig>~s, ~s the Thinr,s jit,nijed /;y them, do agree or di{agree one wzth another; wluch way of JOIOIOg ot feparating of Signs, we call Propolinon. So that Truth properly belongs only to Propofitions: whereof there are two forts, viz. Mental and Verbal; as there are two forts ofSigos commonly madeufeof, viz. Ideas and Words. • · &. 1. To form a clear Notion of Truth, it is very oecerTary to confider Truth of Thought, and Truth of Words, dift1netly one from a.nothcr: but yet it is very difficult to treat of them afunder. Becaufe It 1s unavoidable, in treating of mental Propolitwns '. to make ufe of Words; , and then the infl:anccs given of Mental Propojit10ns, ceafe 1mmed~arely to be barely Mental, and become Verbal. For a mental Pro~ofition being nothing but a bare confideration of the Ideas, as they are m our Mmds flripp'd of Names, they lofe the Nature of purely mental Propolinons, as foon as they are put into Words. §. 4- And that which makes it yet harder ,to treat of mental and _verbal Propojitionsfeparately, is, That moll Men, If not all, m lhe1r Tlunkmg and Reafooings within themfelves, make ufe of Words.mfl:ead of Ideas; •r leafl: when the fubjeCt of their MeditatiOn coo tams 10 It complex Ideas. Which is a great evidence of the imperfeGtwn and uocerta10tyof our Ideas ol that kind, and may, ifattennvely made ufe of, ferve fer •. mark to fl1ew us, what are thofe Things, we have clear and perfeGt efl:ablifl1ed Ideas of, ond what oat. For if we will curioufly obferve the way our Mmd takes in Thin.king and Rcafoning, we f11all find, I fuppofe, that when we make tny Propoiitioris within our own Thoughts, about Wlute or Black, Sweet or Bitter, a Triangle or a Circle, we can, and often do frame 10 our Mmds the Ideas themfelves, . without rcfleGtlllg on the Names: But when we 'Would confider, or make Propolitions about the more complex Ideas, as d a Man, Vitriol, Fortitude, Glory, we ufually put the Name for .the Uea · becaufc the!deas thcfe Names fiand for,bemg for the mofl: part 1m· perfutr, coofufed,and undetermined, we reflell on the Name~ themfelves, becaufe they are more clear, certain, and d1fl:IOGl:, and readiCr occurr ~0 our TJ1ou hts, than the pure Ideas; and fo we makeufe of thefe War s ioftead otf!, the Ideas themfelves, even when we would med1tate and rea· foo within our fclves and make tacit mental Propolinons. In Subfl:ances, "' has been already ~ored, this i< occafioned by the imperfeGt.wn of our lde.u, we making the Name fl:and for the real ElTeoce, of whtch jv{, ha~e no Idea at all In Modes, it is occaliooed by the great number o unp e ldi,as that 'go. to the making them up. For many of the1:n be1ng ve1ry much ' compounded the N-ame occurrs muc 11 ean~ cr, t1 lall thed camdp ex IJe.r ir. If-If which re' quires 'tt.m e and attcnt1·o n to bc reco JleGte 'c. an exI - afrly reprc•i entcd to the Mi.n d ' even ·m t 11 0 Coe Me n: whboe dhaovnee ·bIOy rmtheorf ey, beep at the ]>ains to do It; and IS utterly nnpoOible 10 a f th 'Nho though they have rca d y, I· ll t 1!C ·i t Me ;~r y ' the greate partoc ome- |