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Show 2-10 Names of Subftances. Book III. §. . Thus if the Idea of Body, with fome People, be bare Extenlion, or Spac~, then Solidity is not ej[ential to Body : l~ others make the Idea, to "~Atich they give the name Body, to be Soltdtty and Exten!ion,. then Solidity is elfential alfo to Body. That therefore, and tbat alone a conftdered as ej{ential, wbicb makes a part of.the complex Id<a tbe name of a Sort jfands for, without which, noparttcular Tlung can be reckoned of that Sort, nor be entituled to that name.. Should the:e be found a parcel of Matter, that bad all the other QBahnes t.hat are m Iron, but wanted Obedience to the Load !lone; and would nett her be drawn by tt, nor receive DirC<-'tion from it, Would anyone que!lton, whether tt wanted any thingelfential! It would be ab_furd to ask, Whether a thmg really ext!lmg, wanted any Thing elfent~al to Lt. Or could It be demanded, Whether thts made an elfential or fpec1fick d1fference, or no ; . ftnce we have no other meafure of Elfential, or Specifick, but our ab!lraCI: Ideas ? And to talk of fi'ecifick Differences i~ Nature , Without reference to general Idw and Names, is to talk unmtelltgtbly. For .I would ask any one, What I! fufficient to make an e!fenttal dtfference m Nature, between any two particular Beings, without any regard had to fome ab~raCI: Idea, which is looked upon as the Elfence and Standard of a Spec1es! All fuch Patterns and Standards, being quite hid alide, particular. Being~, ~onlidered oorely in themfelves, ~ill ~ found to have all thetr QBahttes equally e!fential ; and every thmg, 1~ each IndiVIdual , Will )oe e!fent1al to 1t, or which is more true, notlung at all. For though 1t may reafonably b; asked Whether obeying the Magnet, be elfential to Iron? yet, I think, it is very improper and inlignificant to ask , W.hether. it be elfential to that particular parcel of Matter I cut my Pen With, ~lthout c~nlidenng it under the name Iron, or as bemg of a certam Spectes? And 1f, as has been faid, our ab!lraCI: Ideas, which have names annexed to them; are the Boundaries of Species, nothing can be elfential but what is contained in thofe Ideas. ~. 6. 'Tis true, I have often mentioned a real Elfence, di!linCI: in Subfiances, from thofe ab!lraCI: Ueas of them , which I call their nominal Elfences. By this real E!fence, I mean, that real con!litution of any Thing, which is the foundation of all thofe Properties, that are combtned in, and are con!lantly found to co-exi!l with the nominal Elfence; that particular con!litution,which every Tliing has within it felf,without any relation to any thing withoutit.ButEJ{ekce,even in this fenfe,relates to a Sort,an\1 fuppofes a Species: For being that real Con!litution, on wh1ch the Properties depend, it necelfarily fuppofes a fort of Things, Properues belonging only to Species, and ncit to Individuals : "'·g. Suppofing the nominol E.ffence of Gold, to be a Bddy of fuch a peculiar Colour and Weight, with Malleability andFulibility, the real E!fence is that Conflt· tution of the parQ of Matter, on which thefe Qpalities, and their Umon, depend ; and is alfo the foundation of its Solubility in Aq. Regia, and other Propenies accompanying that complex Idea. Here are Elfen· ces and Properties, but all upon fuppolition of a Sort, or general ab!lracl: Idea, wh1ch is confidered as immutable: but there is no individual parcel of Matter, to which any of thefe QBalities are fo annexed, as to be elfenttal to It, or mfeparable from it. That which is elfential, belongs to 1t as a Condition, whereby it is of this or that Sort : But take away the conftderation of its I:Jeing_ ranked urlderthenameoffome ab!lraCI: Idea, and there is nothing neceffary to it, nothing infeparable from ir. Indeed, as to the real Elfe~ces of Sub!lances, we only fuppofe their ffeing, without prec1fely knowmg what they are; But that which allllexes them !ltll tO Chap. VI. · Names of Subftances. ~ 1 ~ -~~-----------~------------~~ to the Species, is the nominal Elfence, of which they are the fuppofed fouitJation and caUfe. .· §. 7· The next thing to be conlidercd is, by which ofthofe Elfences it is, that Sttb}Jances art determiNed into Sorts, or Species; and that 'tis evident, is 6y the nominal EJ[ence. For 'tis that alone, that the name', which is the mark of the Sort, fignilies. 'Tis impoffible therefore, that ~ny thing lhould detcrmiMe the Sorts of Things, which we tank under general Nathes, but that /Jea, which that Name is delign'd as a Mark tor; which is thdt, as has been fl1ewn, which we call the nominal Effence. Why do we fay, This is an Horfe, and that a Mule; this is an Animal, that an Herb ' How come< any particular Thing to be of this or that Sort, but becaufe it has that nominal Elfencet Or, which is all one, •grees to that ab!lroCI: Idea that Name is annexed to 1 And I delire any one but to refleCt on his own Thoughts , when he hears or fpcaks any of thofe, or other Names of Sub!lances, to know what fott of Elfences they !land fur. §. 8. And that the Species of things to u.s, are 11othing but the ranki•f!, th~m underdiffinff Names, according to tbe complex Ideas 1n ti.I; and not according to precife, di!linct, real Eflences in them, is plain from hence ; That we find many of the [ndividuals that are rhnked into om! Sort, called bJ one common Name, and fo received as being of one Species, have yet \.l£alities depending on their real Con!litutions, as far different one from another, as from others, from wluch they are accounted to d11fer fpecifica)ly. This, as it is ealie to be obferved by all, who have to d<;>With natural Bodies; fo Chymi!ls efpectally, are often, by fad Expenence, convinced ofit, when they, fometimes in vain, feek for the fame QB•· lities in one parcel of Sulphur, Antimony,. or Vitriol, which they have found in others. For though they are 13odtes of the fame Spcctes, ha vmg the fame nominal Effence, under the fame Name; yet do they ofren, upon fevere ways of examination, betray Qgalities, fo different one from another, as to frul1rate the ExpeCtation and Labour of very wary Ch~mifls. !lut if Things were di!linguifl1ed into Specres, accordmg t'? thetr teal Elfcnces it would be as impoi!iblc to lind different Properttes m any two individu;l Subfhnces of the fame Species, as it is to find different Properties in two Circles, or two equilateral Triangles. That is properly the Effence to us which dctenmnes every particular to thLS or that Claj!is; or, which i; the fame Thing, to this or that general Name:. And what Cln that be elfe, but that ab!lract Idea, to wluch that name JS annexed 1 and fo has,in truth, a reference, not to much to the bemg of particular Things, as to their genero I Denominations .. §. g. Nor indeed ca11 we rank, and fort Thmgs, and confequently (which is the end of forting) dcnominatethem6; tbei< r;al Effences, be• caufe we know them not. Our Faculties carry u.< 110 farther towards the knowledge and di!linction of Subflances, than a CollcCI:ion ofthofe fenlible Ideas, which we obferve in them: wluch however made Wtth the greate!l diligence, and exa<'lncls we arc capab~e of; J:et our complex ld~a IS more remote from rlle true mtcrnal GonJ:bturwn, from wJuch thofc ~a lilies fl~w than as l faid, a Countryman's Idea is, from the inward contri vance ~[ that'f.1mous Clock at Strasborg, whereof he only fees the outward figure and Motions. There is not fo contempttble a Plan!, or Animal thar does not confound the mo!lmlargcd Under!land· ing. Though tl;e familiar ufc of Things about us, takeoff our Wonder; yet it cures not our Ignorance. When we come to exam me the Stones, We tread on ; or the [ron, we daily handle, we prefemly lind, we know_ Ee> n~ |