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Show r8o True and Falfe Ideas. Book II. Violet, be only :l. peculiar Texture of Parts, or elfe that very Colour, the Jdeawhereof(which is in us) is the exact refcmblance. A~d 1t 1s equally from that Appearahce, to be den01;u~ated Blue, whether 1t te that real Colour or only a peculiar Texture 10 It, that caufes m us that Ide": Smcc the Name Blue notes properly nothing, but that Mark ?f Difiinction, that is in a Violet,difcernable only by our Eyes, whatever It con fills 111, tim being beyond our Capacities difhnB:ly t~ know, and, perhaps, would be oflef.<ufc to us, if we had Faculues to d1fcern. ~. '5· Neither would it carry any Imputauon of Fnlfhood to our fim· pie Ideas, if by the different Structure of our Org,ans, It were fo ordered, That tbe fame Objefl jbould produce 1H {e1w.d Mens Mmds different Ideas at the fame time; v.g. if the Idea, that a VI?Iet produced in.one Man's Mind by his Eyes, were the fame th~t a Mmgold produced 10 another Man's, and viet wr{J. For Iince tins could never be known: becaufe one Man's Mind could not pafs into another Man's Body, to perceil'e what Appearances were produced by thofe Organs; neither the Ideas hereby, nor the Names, would be at all confounded, or any Falfhood be in either. For all Things that had the Texture of a Violet, producing con. fiantly the Idea, wh1ch he called Blue; and thofe which had the Texture of a Marigold, producing confiantly the ltfea, which he as conflant!y called Yellow, whatever thofe Appearances were in his Mind; he would be able as regularly to difiingui01 Things for his Ufe by thofe Appearances, and underfiand, and lignifie thofe difrinctions, marked by the Names Blue and Yellow, as if the Appearances, or IJ<as in his Mind, received from thofe .two Flowers, were exaClly the fame with the Ideas in other Men's Minds. I am neverthelefs very apt to think, that the fenfible Jdw, produced by any ObjeCt in different Men's Minds, are mofr commonly very near and undifcernably alike. For which Opinion, I think, there might be many Reafons offered ; but that beingrbefides my prefent Bufinefs, I !hall not trouble my Reader with them; but only mind him, that the contrary Suppofition, if it could be proved, is of little ufe, either for the Improvement of our Knowledge, orConvcniency of Life; and fo we need not trouble our felves to examine it. .~· 16. From what has been !aid concerning our limple Ideas, T think, it ev~dem,That out jimple Ideas can 11onl? of t!oem be falfe,in rejpefl of Thi11gs ~xifrwg Without us .. For the Truth of thefe Ap'pearanccs, or Perception• tn our Mwds, confifimg, as has been faid, only in their being anfiverablc to the Powers iA external ObjeGs, to produce by our Senfes fuch Appearances in us: and each of them being in the Mind, fuch as it is, fuitable to the Power that produced it, and which alone it reprefents it cannot 'llpon that Account, or as referr'd to fuch a Pattern, be fai/·e. Blue or Yellow, Bitter or Sweet, can never be falfe Ideas, tllefe Perceptions in the Mind,. are jufl fuch as they are there, anfwering the Powers appointed by God to produce them ; and fo are truly what they are, and are inten· ded to .be. Indeed the Names may be mifapply'd; but that in this ref peer, makes no FaiOJood 10 the Ideas: As if a Man ignorant in the Englijh Tongue, fhould call Purple, Scarlet. ' ' ~. '7· &condly, Nttber can our complex Ideas of Mod'!, in reference to the Eflt.nc~ of a•J Tbmg really exij/ing, be fal.fe. Becaufe whatever com· plex ilta I have of any Mode, it hath no reference to any Pattern ,xift< mg, and made bJ: Nature: it is not fuppofed to contain in it any othcfl Ideas, than what It hath; nor to reprefent any thing, but fuch a Complri cation of ftleas, as It does. Thus when I have the idea of fuch an Acriort of a Man, who forbears to afford himfelf fuch Meat Drink and Cloathing,. ' ' and Chap.XXXl. . 1 rue and Fa/fe Ideas. and other Conveniehcies of Life, :15. his Riches and Eflate will be fufficient to fupply, and h~s frauon requites, I have no falfe Idea; but fuch ns reprefents an Actton , either as I find, or imagine it; and fo is capable of ne1thcr Truth, or fallhood. But when I give the name frugality, or lferrue, to th1s Action, then It may be called a falfe Idea if thereby it be fuppofed to a!'rce with that Idea, to which, in propriety df Speech, the name of Frugahty doth belong; or to be conformable to that Law which is the Standard ofVertue and Vice. ' ~.I 8. Tbirdly, Our complex ldfa! of Subf/ances , being all rrfured to Patter•' m Tl>i•gs t!mnfelves, may be fa/.fe. That they are all falfe, wh~n loo.kcd upon as the Reprefenfations of the unknown Effencrs of Tlungs' IS fo evident, th~t there needs nothing to be faid of it. I n~a!l therctore pafs over that clumencal Suppofition, and confider them as Col~ lethons oflimplc Ideas in the Mind , taken from Combinations of lim pie Ideas ex1fhng tog~ther confiantly in Things , o~ which Patterns, they are the fuppofcd Cop1es: And 111 tlusrcference of them to the exiHcnce of Things, they are fal{e !de"s: I. Wben they put toge'therfimple Idea1 , ~luch 111 the real Ex10ence of Things, have no union; as when to the Shape, and .'i•ze,that cxifr together in a Horfc, is joined, in the fame complex Idea, the power of Barking like a Dog: Which three Ideas, how• ever put toge>hcr mto one 111 the Mind, were never united in Nature ' and.this therefore may be called a falte Idea of an Horfe. 2, Ideas oi" Subfiances arc, in this rcfpect, alfo falfe, wben from any CollcLtion of. iimple.Ideas, that do always·exifr together, there is feparated, by a diretl: Negat~on, any other iimple Idea, which is confiant!y. joined with them. Thus If to Exteniion, Solidity,Fufibility,the peculiar Weightinefs and yellow Colour of Gold, any one join in his Thoughts the Negation of a greater degree of fixednefs, than is in Lead, or Copper; he may be faid to have a falfe complex Idea, as well as wlten he joins to thofe other lim pie ones, the Idea qf pcrfcd abfolute Fixednefs : for either way, the complex IJ-. of Gold being made up of fuch iimple ones, as have no union in Nature, may be termed falfe. But if he!eave out of this his complex Idea, that of. Fixednefs quite, without either actually joining to, or fcpara! U>g of It from the refi in his Mind, it is, I think, to he looked on, as an madcquate and imperfcLt Idea, rather than a fa!fe one: f111ce though it conta111s not all the lim pie Jcleas that are united in Nature, yet it puts none together, but what do r<."J!Iy exifi together. ~. 19. Though io compliance with the ordinary way of Speaking, I have 01ewed in what fcnfe, and upon what ground our /deal may be fomctimes called true, or falfc; vet if we will look a little nearer into the !ll:lttcr in all cafes, whcrcnny idea is call'd true, or falfe, it is from.fome Judgment that the Mind makes,or isfuppofed to make,that is truc,o• falfe. For Trutb, or Faifhoot!, being.11ever JVitbout fome Ajirm'ation, or Nega·tipu, Expre(s, or Tacit, i~ is not to be found, but where ligns are joined or feRJrated, (!Ccording to the agreement, or difagreement, of the Things they 11and for. The figns we chiefly ufe, arc either Ideas, or·Words; Wherewith ll'e make either mental, or-verbal Propofitions. Truth lies in fo joining, or feparating thefe Reprefentatives, as the Things they !land lor, do, 10 themfclvcs, agree, or difagrec: and Fallhood in the eomrary, as !hall be more fully nJcwcd hereafter. . ~. 20. Any Idea th~n we have in our Minds, whetherconR>rmable, or ~ot, to the exifrence ofTh(ngs, or to aay Irleas in the Minds of other Men, can.not properly for tlus alone be called falfe. For thefe Rep.refentatiOns, II they have nothing in them,. but what 1~ ,really exiJbng 10 · Things |
