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Show '1ru6 and Falft Ideas Book II. §. 6. Thefe Suppolitions, the Mind i~ very a~t tacitly to make concer. ning its own Ideas. But yet Jf we w1ll exarnme 1t, we flmll find lt 1s ch1efly, if not only concerning its abfiract complex Ide~s. F~r the. natural ten. dency of the Mind being towards Knowledge; andlfindmg 1f 1t flJOuld proceed by, and dwell upon only particular Things, its Progrefs would beve· ry flow and its Work endlefs: Therefpre to fhorten 1tsway to Knowledge, ttnd make each Perception the more comprehenfive ; the firfi Thing it does, as the Foundation of the eafier enlarging its . Knowledge, .pit her by Contemplation of the things t~emfelves, , tha~ it would know; 9r conference with others about them,1s to bmd them 1nt0 Bundles, and ,rank thelll fo into forts, that what Knowledge ir-gets of any of them, it m~y thereby with alfurance extend to all ot that fort; and fo advance by larger llep~ in that which is its great Bufinefs, Knowledge. This, as I have elfewhere lhewed, is the Reafon why we <;oliect Things under comprehenfive Ideas, with Names annexed to them into Genera and ~pecies; i.e. into kinds, and forts. ·. 1 §. 7. If therefore we will warily attend to the Motions of the Mind, and obferve what Coufe it ufually takes in its way to !{now ledge, 1~e fhall, I think, find that the Min~ having got any Iden, which it thinks it lllay have ufe or,either in Contemplation or Difcour(e; the firfi Thing it does, is to abfiract it,and then get a Name to it; and fo lay it up in itsStore-houfe, the Memory, as containing the Elfence of a fort ·of'Things, of which that Name is always to be the Mark. Hence it is, that we may oftery'obferve, that when any one feeS- a· new THing of a kind that he knows not, he pre· fently asks If hat it is, meaning by that Enquiry nothing but the Name. As if the Name carried with ittheRnowledge of the Species,or the Elfence of it; whereofit is indeed ufed as the Mark, and is generally fuppofed an· ntxed to it. • 1 " .i ~- 8. But this abfiract Idea, being fomething In the Mind between the thing that exills, and· the Name that is given to it, it is in our Ueas,that both the Rightnefs of our Knowledge, and the Propriety or Intelligible· nefs of our Speaking confills. And hence it i~, that Men are fo forward to fuppofe, that the abfiract Ideas they have in their Minds, are fuch as agree to the Things exifiin& without them, to which they are referr'd; and are the fame alfo, to winch the Names they give them, do by the Ufe and Propnety of t\Jat Language belong: For without this dou61e Confor"' ifJ of tlieir Idea!, they find, they lhould both think amifs of Things in themfe!ves, and talk of them unintelligibly to others. ~-9· Firft then, I fay, That when the Truth of our Idf:~s if judged of, ~ythe Conformity theyhav,e to the Ideas IVbicb other Men baw, and com· "'••/y Jignife ~y the fame Na".'e, thet may h all)! of them Jal{e. But yet jimple Ideas are leaf1 of all /Ja6/e to be fo mif/aken. Bccaufe a Man by Ius Senfes, and every Da:(s Obfi:!'Vatioti, may eafily farufie himfclf, what the limple Ideas are, wh1ch the1r feveral Names, that are in common u(e fiand for,_ they being but few in Number; and fucb, as if he doubts, or mtllakes m, he may eafily reCl:ifie by the Objeth they are to be found in. Theref~re 1t 1S feldom, that any one mifiakes in his Names of fimplc!deaJ l or apphes the Name Rd., to the Idea of Green; or the Name Sweet, to the I d._ B1tter: Much !efsareMen apt to confound the Names belong· ing to di~erent Senfes ; and call a Cdour, by the Name of a Talle, {5c, whereby 1t 1S evtdent, that the fimple Ideas, they call by any Name, are commonly the fame, that others have and mean, when they ufe the fum; Name•. §. 10. Chap. XXXI. True and _Falfe !dear. 9. 10. Complex Ideas are much more liable to ~e f~lfe in this rejpell; d the complex Ideas of mixed M•des;much more than thl!fe of Su/,ftances: B~caufe inSubfiances, (efpecially thofe, _which the common and unbar: rowed Names of any Language are apphed to,) f~me rema~kable fenfible ~alities [erving ordinarily to difiinguith one fort from another, _eafily preferve ;hofe, who take any Care in the ufe of their Words, from. applying them to forts of Subfiances, to which they_ do ?Ot at all belong. Buc in mixed Modes, we are much more uncertam, 1t _bemg . not fo eafir to determine of feveral Actions; whether th_ey are w be ~ailed ]uflice, or Cr•elty; Liberality, or Prodigality. And fo m,refernngour Ideas to thofe of other Men, cal!'d by the fame Name; ours_ may be falfe; and our Jrlea we call Jullice, may, perhaps, be that wluch ought to have another Na~m.eu, .Butwhetherortloourldearo f mt·x e d M.o d e sa·r e· more 1'· bl. h. 1a et an 2 ny fort, w be different from thofe o_f other Mert, whtch are marked by ·rhe fame Name : Tl1is at leafi 1s certam, That t hu fort of Faljhood IS much more familiarly •ttriboted to our Ideas of mrxed Modes, than to all)! other. When a ~an is thought to have a falfe Ide~ of Juftrce, or _Gratz~ude, or Glo1y, it is for no other Reafon, but that hiS agrees not With the Ideas, which each of thofe Names are the S1gns of m other Men. The Reafon IVhereof feems to me to be this,_ That the abfiract Ideas of miicoo Modes, being Men's voluntary Combmattons of fuch a pr~ctfe ColJectiori of fimple Ideas ; and fo the Elfence of each Spec1es, bemg made by Men alone, whereof we have no othe~ fenfible Standard, ex1fimg any where, but the Name it felf, or the defimuon of that Name: We have nothingelfe to refer thefe our Ideas of m1xed Modes toasStnndards,tow!ucli we would conform them, but the ideas of thofe, who are thought to ufe lhofe Names in their rrtofi proper S~gmficat10ns; and fo as our Ideas conform, or differ from them, they pafs for true or fal(e. And thus muc_h concerning the Truth and l'alfhood of our Ideas, m reference to their Na~~~j. Secondly, As to the Truth and Falfh_ood of our Ideas, iN referenc_e to the real Exiftence of Things, when that IS made the Standard of thetr Truth, none of them can be termed falfe, but only our complex Ideas of Subllances. . . ~- 14. Firf1, Our fimple Ideas, bemg barely fuch Percepttons, asGod has fitted us to receive, and gtven Power to exte_rna! ObJetls to produce m us by ellablifhcd Laws, and Ways, futtab!e to h1s Wifdom a?d Goodnef~, though incomprehenfible to us, thetr Truth confifis .m nothmg elfe,but m (lith A ~pearances,as are prod_uced m us,and mufi be fmtable to thofe P~wers?. he has placed in external ObJects, or elfe they could not be produced m us. And thus anfweringthofe Powers, they are :ovhat they fhould be, true Ideas. Nor do they become liable to any Imputation of Falfhood, 1fthe Mmd (as !o moll Men I believe it does) judges the Ideas to be m thefe Thmgs the~felves. For God in his Wifdom, having fet them as Marks o_t D1fim.~ ion in Things, whereby we may be able to d1fcern one Thmg from another. and lo chufe any of them for our ufes, as we have Occalion: It alter; not the Nature of our lim pie_ idea, whether we think that the Idea of Elue be in the Violet it felf, or m our Mmd only; and QDly_ the Power of pr~ducing it by the Texture of its Parts, r_ellecting the ll'rtlcles ofLight, after a cerrainManner,to bem the V10let It felf. For that TexIUre in the Obje-01:, operating regularly and conflantly, producm& the ftme Idea of Blue in us it ferves us to d1fimgmfh,by our Eyes, that. trom any other Thing wheti1cr that dillinguifhing Mark, as 1t IS-really m th~ ' A a ~ VIolet, 179 |