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Show 78 Simple Modes of Space._ ~------------~---- Book II. Inane of infinite Space; tho' it be true,that the Word Placc,has fometimcs a more confufed Senfe, and fiands for that Space, wluch any Body takes up· and fo the Univerfe is in a Place §. u. The Jd•a therefore of P l.1ee, we have by ehe fame means, that we get the/d•a of Space, (whcreofthi~ is but a particul~r limited Confidcration, "Vi~. by our Stght and Touch; by etthcrofwluch we recetve mto our Minds the Jtleas of Extenfion or Difiance. §. 11• There arc fomc that would pcrfuade us, that Botly anti Extenjion are the fame thiNg; who either change the Signification of Words, which 1 would not fufpeCl: them of, they having fo feverely condemned the Philofophy of others, becaufe it hath been too much _placed in the uncertain meaning, or decettful obfcunty of doubtful, or mfigmficant Terms. If therefore they mean by Body and Exten}ion tl" fame,thatother People do, "Viz. by Body tomething that is folid, and extended, whofe parts are fepanible and movable different ways; and by Extenfion,only the Space that lies between the Extremities ol thofe folid coherent Parts, and which is polfelTed by them, they confound very different Ideas one with another. For I appeal to every Man's own Thoughts, whether the !de a of Space be not as dtftinCl: from that of Solidity, as it is from the Ide. of Scarlet-Or Jour 1 'Tis true, Solidity cannot exift without Extenfion, neither can Scarlet Colour exift without Extenfion ; but this hinders not, but tbat they are difhnCl: Idear. Many Ideas require others, as neceifary to their Exiftence or Conception, which yet are very difiinCl: Ideas. Motion can neither be,' nor be conceived without Space; arrd yet Motion is not Space, nor Space Motion ; Space can cxifl: without ir, and they are very diftina !dear ; and fo, I !l1ink, are thofe of Space and Solidity. Solidity is fo infeparable an Idea from Body, that upon that depends its filling of Space, its ContaCt, lmpulfe, and Communication of Motion upon lmpulfe. And if it be a Reafon to prove, that Spirit is different from Body,becaufe Thinkin?, includes not the id•a of Extenfion in it ; the fame Reafon will be as valid, I fuppofe,to prove, that Space iJ •ot Bod!', becaufe it includes not the fd_. of Solidity in it; Space a11tl Solidity being as diflinEI !dear, as Thinking and Extenfion, and as wholly feparable in the Mind one from another: Body then and Exten}ion, 'tis evident, are two difiinCl: Ideas ; tor Firft, · Extenfion includes no Solidity, nor refiftence to the Motion of Body, as Body does. Secondly, The Parts of pure Space are infeparable one from the other; fo that the Continuity cannot be feparated, neither really, nor mentally. For I demand <lf any one, ro remove any part of it from •nother, with which it is continued, even fo much as in Thought. To divide and feparate actually is, as I think, by removing the parts one from another, to make two Superficies, where before there was a Continuity: And to divide mentally, is to make in the Mind two Superficies, where before there was a Continuity, and confider them as removed one from the other; which can only be done in things eonfidered by the Mind, as capable of being feparated; and by feparation, of acquiring new difiinCl: Superfictes, whtd! they then have not, but are capable of: But neither of thefe ways of Separation, whether real or mental, is, as I think, compattble to pure Space, §. IJ. 'Tis true, a Man may confider fo much of fuch a Space, as i> anfwerablc or commenfurate ~o a Foot, without confidering the reft;whiciJ ts mdeed a parttal Conftderatton, but not fo much as mental Separation, or Dtvttion; fince a Man can no mmc mentally divide without conft· dcring two Superficies, feparate one from the other, tha~ he can actually dlV!de, wtthout mak10g two Su[~erficies disjoin'<! one from the other: But . Chap. XIII. Simple Modes of Space. ~uta partial ~onfid~ration is not fepar~tinl?. A Man may confider Light ill the Sun, wttlwut tts Heat ; or Mobthty ill Body without its Extenfion without thinking of their feparation, One. is only a partial Confideration: ternunatmg m one alone; and the other IS a Conftdr;ration of both as cxifting feparately. ' ' §. 14. 'Jbirdly, The parts of pure Space, are immovable which follows from their infeparability; fl'Iotio.n being nothing but ci1ange of di· fiance between any two dungs: But tlus cannot be between Parts that are infeparable; which therefore mufi needs be at perpetual reft on~ a~ngft another. Thus th<: clear and diftinCl: Idea ~;>ffimple Spaa difiinguifhes it plainly, and full1Ciently from Bo4y; Iince Jts Parts are infeparable immovable and without refifience to tlje Motion of Body. ' ' §. r )· If any one ask me, What this Space, I fpeak of, 1s; I will tell him when he tells me what, his Extetifion is. Fort<;> fay, as is ufually done' . That Extcntion is to have partes ex'tra partes, is t\) fay only, That Ex~ ttn(i•n ts Exten(t011: For ;vhat nm I the better infoqned in the ~ature of Extenfio~, when I am told, That Extenji-. iJ to !Ja,,e partf tbat are ex• tent!ed, exteriar t~ parts t~at are exte,rfe_,~) i.e .. Exun/ionconiifis of extended P'1rt>! As 1f one aslung, What a F 1bre was; I lhould anfwer him , That it was a thing made up of fevera! Fibres : Woul;l he l1ereby be ena~ bled to m]derfiand what a Fibre was, better than he did before ; . Q{ rather, would he not h~ve reafon to think, ~hilt my ~~~fign was to make fport ' with him, rather than ferioufly to inftruCl: him; §. r6. Thofe who contend that Spare and Body arc the fame pring ~llis {Ji!emma : Either this Spaa is fomething or qothing; if nothipg be between two Bodies, they mufi nece(farily touch; if it be allowi'CI to 4e .(ometlung, they ask, whether 1t be BOdy or Sp'{\t1 Towj~ch I an· fwer by anothe~ Q!!efiion, ~ho tqld them,, that there was, or equip be notlung but fohd Be10gs wluch could not thmk, and thinkmg Be; ngs, that were not exte11ded 1 Which is all they II!ean by the termsBodj and' Spirit. §. 17. If tt be demanded (as ufually 1t ts) whether thts Space void of ' Bpdy, be Subflanceor Accident, I !hall readily anfwer, I know noi · nor :!hall be aOmmed to own my Ignorance, till they that ask, fl1cw me; clear diftinct idea of Su6flance. §. r8. I endeavour, as much as I can , to deliver my felf from thofe Fallacies, which we are apt to put upon our felves, by taking Words for . Things. It he! ps not our Ignorance, to feigrr a ~nowledgc, where we ha\'e none , by making a noife with Sounds, without clear and difiinCl: Significations. Names made at pleafure, neither alter the nature of things, nor make us underftand them, but as they arc figns of, and fiand lor clear and diil;inCl: /tlea1. And I defire thole who lay fo IJ!UclJ firefs on the found ' of thefe two Syllables, Suhjlance, to ~onficjer, wh~ther applying it, as _they do, to t)le infinite incomprehenfible G 0 D, tq finite Spirits, and to , Bpdy, it pe in the fame fenfc ; and whether it fiand for the fame Idea, when fa~h of thofe three fo dilferenf Beings are called Su/;fl•nm; If fo, whether it will not thence follow, That God, Spirits, and Body, agreemg tn tl)e' farne common nature of Su6jlance,ddfcr ~or any otherwifc than in a bare diaerent modification of thaf St~6/lancr; as a Tree and a Pebble, . being in \he fatne fcnf~ bqdied, and agreeing in the common nature of l.lody, di/f~r only in a b;tre modification of that common matter; which will !Je a ve,ry harfl1 Poctrine. If they fay, That rh~y apply it ro God, finite Spirits, and M~tter, in three different fignifications, and that it Hands fo~ one idea, when G 0 p is faid to be i Suhflan" ; for another, when '79 |