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Show =r 'Degrees of Ajfent. Book IV. dowmvnrds in thofe parts of ~he Creatiorr, t.hat Me beneath Man, the Rule of Analogy may tnake it probable, that 1t 1s fo alfo !n :Chmgs aboQ<r us, and our Obfervation · a:nd that there are feveral ranks of mtalhgent lk1figs, excelling us in feverai degrees of Perfection, afcending· upwards towards the infinite Perfection of the Creator, by genvlu fieps andchfferences, that are every one at no great diflancd fr~m the next. to it.Tiris fort ofPtobability, which is the befl conduct of ratlonal Expenments,and the nfe of flypothefis has alfo its Ofe and Influence: ~nd a wary Reafomng from A~alogy leads w often into the difcovery of Truths, and ufeful Product10 ns, which would otherwife lie concealed. ~. 1 0. Though the common Experience, and the ordinary Courfe of Things have ju{lly a mighty Infl~enceon the Mmds.of Men, to makG them give or refufe Credit ro any thmg propt>fed to the1r Behef; yet there is one Cafe, wherein the firangenefs ol the Fad: lelfens not the Affi!nt t6 a fair Teflimony given of it. For where fuch fupernatural Events are fuitable to ends aim'd at by him, who has the Power ro change the cour(e of Nature,therc,unaer filch Circumflances, they may be the fitter to procure. Belief, by how much the more they are beyond, or contrary to ordinary Obfcrvotion. • This is the proper C.fe of Miracles, which well aro tefled, do not only find Credit themfelves; but give it alfo to other Truths, which need fuch Confirmation. · §. '4· Befides thofe we have hitherto mentioned, there is one IOrt of Propolitions that challenge the highefl degree o.f our Affcnt, upon bare · Tefiimony, whether the thing protJofed, agree ot difagree with common Experience, and the . ordinary toutfe of Things, or no. The Reafon whereof is, becaufe the Tefiimony is of fuch an one, as cannot deceive, fior' be deceived, and that is of God h,imfelf. This carries with it Certainty bc)'ond Dou~i, Evidence beyond Exception. This is called by :1 peculiatName, /levdatiDn, and our Alfen~ro it, Faith: which has as muclt Certainty as our Kt\owle'dge it felf; and we may as well doubt of our own Being, as we can, whether any Revelation from G 0 D be true. So that Faith is a fetled and fure PrincipleofAlfent and Aifurance, and leaves no manner of room for Doubt or Hefitarion : Only we rnu!l: be fure, that it be a divine Revelation, arnl tlmr we undcrfland ir right; elfe we flull expofeour felv~s to all the Extravagancy of Enthufiafm, and all the Error of wrong Principles, if we have F~ith and Affurance in what is not divine Revelation. And therefore In .thbfe Cafes, our Alfent can be rationally no higher than the Evidence of Its being a Revelation, and that this is the meaning of the Expreffions it·is delivered in. If the Evidence of its being a Revelation,or that this its true Senfe be only on probable Proof>, our Allent can reoch no higher than an Affurance or Diffidence, arifing from the more, or lefs apparent Probability of the Proofs. But of Faith, and the Precedency it ought to have before other Arguments of Perfuafion, I !hall fpeok more hereafter, where I treat of it, as it is ordinarily placed, in contradiflindion to RcHon: though in Tmth, it be nothing elfe but an Alfent founded on the highefi Rea!on. CHAP. , Chap. XVII. ,, ., Reafou. C HAP • .X:'VIf. 'I ., .OJ !J{_eajo11. .,, nr 'm· • • I 1Hb :!l ~11 .,.!, ., l' L1011 • ;.,;r ~ i•T HE Word Reafollli'n the En,;lifo Lmguage.hzl]•diffmnt!!i·~hil . . jications: fometimes it is taken fur true, •anli•cleor Princljl e~~· Somenmes for clear, and f3lr .deductions fr,m thofe Pdndples: and'fo ctimes for the Cilofr, and particularly the final C.ufa·~ I:Jin) the C6nfidt1'il rion [!hall have of it here, is in a Signification ditferent~from all tllefe j and that is, as it fiands for a' Fllculty in Man, That Faculty, whereh{M:!rt is fuppofed ro''bo diflingtiifhcd from Beafu, and wl\eroin it w evident he much furpalfeultem. , 10, .. • ~. "· lf.gen~ral Knowledge, as has been lhcwn, .CQnflfls in a Petcc' ption of the Agreement, or Difagreemunt of Oll! owli 'Ideas. ond tl;e Knowledge of the Exiflence of al) Things without us' (excep~ only of G 0 D) be ha<l only by bur Senfes i What roorJ;J then Is there for the Extr~fe of atty dther Faculty, but outward Senfe and inward Perception 1 What need is I here of Reafon? Very much: both fdr the Enlargement of our Knowledge; end regulating our Affent : For it hath to do, both in Knowledge and Opinion, and is neceffi.ty, and affifling to all out other illtelled:uall'atulties, and indeed contaim two of themJ viz. Sagaei'ty 'find 1Uilti6•: By the" one, it finds out, and by the other1 iJ fo orders thii in· tetmediate Jd~Js, as todifcover what tonnt>:ion thl!t'e is in each linkof~he Chain, \vhefcll)' the Extrem<l$ a-re held tOgether; bnd tlielc~y, !!$It lfefe, to drill< in ttl lJitw the Truth ftrught for, whloh is tha't· We aJil!lfatiiin '6( tnferente, a11tl t6nftfls irfl ndthing but the Perceptlo(i 6f the eorlncxiort there is between the Ideas, in each fiep of the dedut:t~oh, \vhereby rhd Mind ctJme~ to fee1 either the certain Agreement or Oill!gree.mcntoflady tWo Ideas, aY in Demonflration, in which it arrives at Knoll'ledge; or their probable eonnexion, oti which it gives or with-holds its Atrenr, as ill Opinion, Senfe ahd Intuition reach bm a very little way ; ·the grealtfi {l:ttt of lfur !\now ledge depends updr\ Deductions and intermediate ldtizs: And in thofe Cales, whe~e we nrc f-1in ro. li1bflitute Affent _illfle:lt\ of Knowledge, and take Ptopofiuons (or true, Wltilout bemg certa1q th>y ~re fo, we hav~ need to find out, examine, and compnrethe groundsuf their Probability. In both tiMe C.f!S, tile Faculty which finds but· the' Means, and rightly applies them to dlfcovcr Certainty in tile one, h'nu Probability in the other, i9• thnt which \ve call Reafon. For as Rt":ifon perceives the ncceffary, and i11dubitiblc c01inexioh of all the !dea!"oF Proofs ohe to another, in fficli fiep of any Dembnllration that produce>' Knowledge: fo it likewife perceives the probable conncxion of all the lde4S or Proofs one to another, in every ficp of a Difcourfe, to which it \viii think Atfent due. This is the lowefi degree of that, which can be truly called Reofun: For where the Mind docs not perceive this probable Connexion; \vhcre it does not difcern, )Vhethcr there be any fuch conntxion, or no, there Me!l's Opinions are not the product of Judgment,. Otthc Confcqucnce of Reafon; but the eRects afChance and !-Iazard, ol a Mind florttin" at all Adventures, without choice, and wirhoui direchon. ~.1. So t!ia:'we may in Reafon co1ifider thefe Jour degrees; the firfi and highcfl, is the difcovering, and finding out of Prools ; the fe~ond, the rr·gular and methodic~! Difpofition of them, ami bJ!Og them 10 a clear anc\ |
